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We study robust versions of pricing problems where customers choose products according to a general extreme
value (GEV) choice model, and the choice parameters are not given exactly but lie in an uncertainty set. We
show that, when the robust problem is unconstrained and the price sensitivity parameters are homogeneous,
the robust optimal prices have a constant markup over products and we provide formulas that allow to
compute this constant markup by binary search. We also show that, in the case that the price sensitivity
parameters are only homogeneous in each subset of the products and the uncertainty set is rectangular, the
robust problem can be converted into a deterministic pricing problem and the robust optimal prices have a
constant markup in each subset, and we also provide explicit formulas to compute them.
For constrained pricing problems, we argue that the formulation where the aim is to find purchase prob-
abilities that maximize the expected revenue while satisfying some expected sale constraints, even-though
convenient to use when the choice parameters are exactly known, is not appropriate in our uncertainty
setting, as there may be no fixed prices under which the resulting purchase probabilities always satisfy
the expected sale constraints when the choice parameters vary in an uncertainty set. Thus, we propose an
alternative formulation where, instead of requiring that the expected sale constraints be satisfied, we add a
penalty cost to the objective function for violated constraints. We then show that the robust pricing problem
with over-expected-sale penalties can be reformulated as a convex optimization program where the purchase
probabilities are the decision variables. We provide numerical results for the logit and nested logit model to
illustrate the advantages of our approach. Our results generally hold for any arbitrary GEV model, including
the multinomial logit, nested or cross-nested logit.
Key words : Robust optimization, multi-product pricing, general extreme value model
1. Introduction
In revenue management, pricing is an important problem that refers to the selection of prices for
a set of products in order to maximize an expected revenue. This is motivated by the fact that
prices are key features that may significantly affect demand for products. The literature of multi-
product pricing has seen a large amount of studies focusing on how to set prices when customers
purchase products according to a discrete choice model (e.g. Talluri and Van Ryzin 2004, Gallego
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and Wang 2014, Zhang et al. 2018). In general, finding prices is challenging as the discrete choice
model becomes more complicated. This is a well-known trade-off between choice model complexity
and operational tractability in revenue management. In a recent work, Zhang et al. (2018) study
the pricing problem under the general extreme value (GEV) family of choice models (McFadden
1980). Their results are general, as they apply to any choice model in the GEV family, e.g., the
multinomial logit (MNL) and nested logit models, to name a few. To the best of our knowledge,
existing studies all assume that the parameters of the choice models are known in advance or can
be estimated exactly from data. Thus, the corresponding pricing optimization models are built
based on the pre-determined parameters and ignore any uncertainty associated with the estimates.
Nevertheless, in practice, the parameter estimates may vary significantly for different customer
types or in different purchasing periods of the year. Thus, ignoring such uncertainties may lead to
bad pricing decisions.
In this paper, we formulate pricing optimization models explicitly taking into consideration
uncertainties occurring in the determination of choice parameters when customers make purchases
according to choice models in the GEV family. That is, we assume customers’ behavior is driven by
any choice model in the GEV family such as the MNL or nested logit model, and the parameters of
the choice model are not given exactly but belong to an uncertainty set. In other words, we consider
robust versions of the pricing problem under GEV models considered in Zhang et al. (2018).
The goal here is to maximize the worst-case expected revenue when the estimates vary in their
support set. We consider both unconstrained and constrained problems where the price sensitivity
parameters (PSP) are homogeneous or partition-wise homogeneous, i.e., the set of products can be
separated into disjoint subsets and the PSP are the same in each subset but can be different over
subsets. Our results for unconstrained problems hold for any choice model in the GEV family. For
the constrained problem, we argue that the constrained model relying on purchase probabilities
as decision variables is not appropriate for a robust version. Therefore, we propose an alternative
formulation by adding a penalty term for violated constraints to the objective function. Our results
in this context holds for the MNL model and for any choice model in the GEV family where the
choice probability generating function (Fosgerau et al. 2013) has a separable structure.
Form now on, when saying “a GEV model”, we refer to any choice model in the GEV family.
Each GEV model can be represented by a choice probability generating function (CPGF) G(·)
(see our detailed definition in the next section). To relax the homogeneity of the PSP, we need to
assume that the CPGF has a separable structure, which means that G(·) can be written as a sum
of sub-CPGFs, each corresponding to a subset of products.
Our contributions: We consider robust versions of the standard pricing optimization problem
under GEV models. The setting here is to assume that the parameters of the choice model is
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not known with certainty and the aim is to find optimal prices associated with products, which
maximize the worst-case expected revenue when the choice parameters vary in an uncertainty set.
For the unconstrained problem with homogeneous PSP, we show that if the uncertainty set is
convex and compact, the robust optimal prices have a constant markup with respect to the products
costs, i.e., the robust optimal price of a product is equal to its unit cost plus a constant that is the
same over all products. We also provide formulas that allow to efficiently compute that constant
markup by binary search. This finding generalizes the results for the deterministic unconstrained
problem with homogeneous PSP considered in Zhang et al. (2018). We also provide comparative
insights showing how the robust optimal revenue and the robust optimal constant markups change
as functions of the uncertainty level (i.e., the size of the uncertainty set). Our results in this case
holds for any GEV model and with any convex, compact and bounded uncertainty set.
For the unconstrained problem with non-homogeneous PSP, similarly to previous studies (Zhang
et al. 2018), we need to assume that CPGF is partition-wise separable and in each partition,
the PSP are homogeneous. We show that if the uncertainty set is rectangular, then the robust
problem can be converted equivalently into a deterministic pricing problem with partition-wise
homogeneous PSP. As a result, the robust optimal prices have partition-wise constant markups,
i.e., in each partition, the robust optimal prices have a constant markup with respect to their costs,
and these constant markups can be computed by explicit formulas. We further show that, with a
general uncertainty set, a partition-wise constant markup solution might be optimal to the robust
problem. However, such solutions might not exist or are not easy to compute in a tractable way.
We also provide comparative insights for the robust optimal prices and solutions when the size of
the uncertainty set varies.
For the constrained pricing problem, as motivated by the applications with inventory consider-
ations (Gallego and Van Ryzin 1997), previous studies (Zhang et al. 2018, Song and Xue 2007,
Zhang and Lu 2013) also look at constraints on the expected sales. In this context, the aim is
to select prices that maximize the expected revenue while requiring that the expected sales of
products lie in a convex set. The advantage of such constraints is that the pricing problem can
be reformulated equivalently as a convex program where the decision variables are the purchase
probabilities. However, the final decision is a vector of prices and there may be no fixed prices
under which the resulting purchase probabilities always satisfy the expected sale constraints when
the choice parameters vary. For this reason, we consider that the use of the constrained formulation
is not appropriate in our setting. Thus, we propose an alternative formulation in which, instead of
requiring that the expected sale constraints are satisfied, we add a penalty cost to the objective
function for violated constraints. Our formulation, called pricing with over-expected-sale penalties,
is more general than the constrained formulation, in the sense that we show that if the penalty
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parameters increase to infinity, then the corresponding optimal solutions will converge to those
from the constrained problem, and with zero penalty parameters, the pricing problem becomes
the unconstrained one. Since the robust version under over-expected-sale penalties does not seek
a price solution that satisfies the expected sale constraints under choice parameter uncertainty,
it is more appropriate to use than the constrained version. We show that if the choice model is
MNL and the uncertainty set is rectangular, then the robust problem can be converted into an
equivalent deterministic pricing problem with over-expected-sale penalties, and this deterministic
version can be solved by convex optimization. Our results also hold for any GEV model with a
separable structure and under some restrictions on the parameters of the expected sale penalties.
In summary, we show that robust versions of the unconstrained problem are tractable, in the sense
that the robust optimal solutions are shown to have constant markups with respect to the product
costs, and we provide formulas to compute these constant markups efficiently. For the constrained
version, we propose the formulation with over-expected-sale penalties, which is rational to used in
our uncertainty setting, and show that the corresponding robust problem can be reformulated as a
convex optimization problem, which is indeed tractable. Note that one may consider a stochastic
approach to deal with the uncertainty issue, i.e., a model aiming at maximizing an average expected
revenue over a finite number of scenarios of the choice parameters. However, such an objective
function is difficult to handle, as one can show that there may be no constant-markup-style solutions
that are optimal, and the problem optimization is not convex under formulations where the decision
variables are the purchase probabilities.
Literature review: The GEV family includes most of the parametric discrete choice models
available in the demand modeling and operations research literatures. The simplest and most
popular member is the MNL (McFadden 1978, 1980) and it is well-known that the MNL model
retains the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property, which does not hold in many
contexts. There are a number of GEV models that allows to relax this property and provide
flexibility in modeling the correlation between alternatives, for example, the nested logit model
(Ben-Akiva et al. 1985, Ben-Akiva 1973), the cross-nested logit (Vovsha and Bekhor 1998), the
generalized nested logit (Wen and Koppelman 2001), the paired combinatorial logit (Koppelman
and Wen 2000), the ordered generalized extreme value (Small 1987), the specialized compound
generalized extreme value models (Bhat 1998, Whelan et al. 2002) and network-based GEV (Daly
and Bierlaire 2006, Mai et al. 2017) models. Fosgerau et al. (2013) show that the cross-nested logit
model and its generalized version (i.e. network-based GEV) are fully flexible in the sense that they
can approximate arbitrarily close any random utility maximization model. Beside the GEV family,
it is worth noting that the mixed logit model (McFadden and Train 2000) is also popular due to its
flexibility in capturing utility correlation. There is a fundamental trade-off between the flexibility
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and the generality of the choice models and the complexity of their estimation andapplication in
operational problems. For the case of GEV models, even being flexible in modeling choice behavior,
the resulting operational problems (e.g., product assortment or pricing) are often nonlinear and
non-convex, leading to difficulties solving them in practice.
There is a large amount of research on unconstrained pricing under different discrete choice
models. For example, Hopp and Xu (2005) and Dong et al. (2009) consider the pricing problem
under the MNL model, Li and Huh (2011) consider the the nested logit model, Li et al. (2015)
consider the pricing problem under the paired combinatorial logit model, and Zhang et al. (2018)
consider the pricing problem under any choice model in the GEV family. Under the assumption that
the PSP are the same over product, these authors show that the prices have a constant markup with
respect to the product costs and provide formulas to explicitly computed this constant markup.
There are some studies trying to get over the assumption that the PSP are homogeneous over
products. Li and Huh (2011) study the pricing problem under the nested logit model and assume
that the PSP are homogeneous only in each nest and can be different over nests. They then show
that the PSP in each nest have a constant markup. Zhang et al. (2018) generalize these results by
considering the pricing problem under GEV models, in which the CPGF is partition-wise separable
and the PSP are assumed to be homogeneous in each partition. The authors also show that, in
this case, the optimal prices have a constant markup in each partition.
The literature has also seen studies considering the pricing problem with arbitrary PSP. Gallego
and Hu (2014) show that the the pricing optimization problem unde the nested logit model can
have multiple local optimal solutions if the PSP are arbitrarily heterogeneous and provide sufficient
conditions to ensureunimodality of the expected revenue function. Li et al. (2015), Huh and Li
(2015) consider the pricing problem under the d-nested and paired combinatorial logit models
and also provide sufficient conditions on the PSP to ensure unimodality of the expected revenue
function.
The constrained pricing problem where the prices are required to lie in a feasible set is difficult to
solve as the expected revenue function is nonlinear and non-concave in the prices. Motivated by the
applications with inventory considerations (Gallego and Van Ryzin 1997) and the observation that
the expected revenue function is concave in the purchase probabilities, researchers have consider the
pricing problem with constraints on the expected sales. For example, Song and Xue (2007), Zhang
and Lu (2013) consider the pricing problem under the MNL model and show that the expected
revenue is concave in the purchase probabilities if the PSP are homogeneous. Keller (2013) consider
the pricing problem under the MNL and nested logit models and show that the expected revenue
function is concave in the purchase probabilities under the MNL and arbitrary PSP, and establish
sufficient conditions on the PSP to ensure that the expected revenue under the nested logit model
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is concave. Zhang et al. (2018) also generalizes all these results by showing that, under any GEV
model, if the PSP are homogeneous or partition-wise homogeneous, then the expected revenue is
concave in purchasing probabilities, making the pricing problem with expected sale constraints
tractable.
All above studies assume that the parameters of the choice model is given in advance and
ignore any uncertainty associated with such parameters in the pricing problem. However, the choice
parameters typically need to be inferred from data and uncertainties may occur. In this work,
we explicitly take into consider this issue by considering robust versions of the unconstrained and
constrained pricing problems, with homogeneous and partition-wise homogeneous PSP. Our results
directly generalize the results for deterministic pricing from Zhang et al. (2018), which already
covers most of the the pricing optimization studies in the literature.
Our work is concerned with robust solutions for the pricing problem under uncertainty, so it is
directly related to the concept of robust optimization, an important research area in operations
research which has received a growing attention over the past two decades. Robust optimiza-
tion is motivated by the fact that many real-world decision problems arising in engineering and
management science have uncertain parameters due to limited data or noisy measurements. The
literature on robust optimization includes a larger number of excellent studies (see Ben-Tal and
Nemirovski 1998, 2000, Ben-Tal et al. 2006, for instance). Most of the studies in the literature of
robust optimization focus on linear, piece-wise linear or convex objective functions. In our context,
the expected revenue is nonlinear and non-convex/non-concave in the prices, implying that exist-
ing robust optimization results do not apply (except the part where we consider the constrained
pricing problem under uncertain expected-sale constraints in Section A), and making our robust
problem challenging to solve in a tractable way. It is worth noting that our work is relevant to Rus-
mevichientong and Topaloglu (2012) where the authors consider robust versions of the assortment
planing problem. The decision variables in their work are discrete (i.e., a set of assortment) and the
authors were able to obtain some nice results, e.g., they show that if the problem is unconstrained,
then a revenue-ordered assortment is optimal to their robust problem.
Paper outline: We organize the paper as follows. In Section 2, we present the deterministic
pricing problem under GEV models and recall some results from Zhang et al. (2018). In Section
3, we present our results for the robust unconstrained pricing problem under homogeneous and
partition-wise homogeneous PSP. In Sections 4, we study the pricing optimization formulation with
over-expected-sale penalties and its robust version. In Section 5 we provide some experimental
results and in Section 6 we conclude. In the Appendix, we provide discussions onrobust constrained
problems, some detailed proofs and numerical results.
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Notation: Boldface characters represent matrices (or vectors), and ai denotes the i-th element of
vector a. We use [m], for any m∈N, to denote the set {1, . . . ,m}. For any vector b with all equal
elements, we use 〈b〉 to denote the value of one element of the vector. Given two vectors of the
same size a,b∈Rm, a b is equivalent to a−b∈Rm+ , and a b is equivalent to b a.
2. Deterministic Pricing under Generalized Extreme Value Models
We denote by V = {1, . . . ,m} the set of m available products. There is a non-purchase item indexed
by 0, so the set of all possible products is V ∪ {0}. We also denote by xi and ci the price and the
cost of product i, respectively. The random utility maximization (RUM) framework (McFadden
1978) is the most popular approach to model discrete choice behavior. Under this framework, each
product i∈ V is assigned with a random utility Ui and the additive RUM framework (Fosgerau et al.
2013, McFadden 1978) assumes that each random utility can be expressed as a sum of two part
Ui = ui + εi, where the term ui is deterministic and can include values representing characteristics
of the product, and the term εi is unknown to the analyst. The RUM principle then assume that the
selections are made by maximizing these utilities and the probability that an product i (including
the non-purchase item) is selected can be computed as P (Ui ≥Uj, ∀j ∈ V ∪{0}).
In our context, we are interested in the effect of the prices on the expected revenue. So we assume
that the deterministic terms ui, ∀i ∈ V, can be expressed as ui = ai − bixi, where bi is the PSP
associated with product i and ai can include other information that may affect customer’s demand
such as the brand, size or color of the items. These values can be obtained by fitting the choice
model with observation data. As mentioned above, the estimation process may cause uncertainties
associated with such estimates. Note that here we assume that the utilities ui depend linearly on the
prices, which is a popular assumption in most of the existing pricing studies. Nonlinear formulation
would make the pricing problem much more difficult to deal with, but would be interesting to look
at in future research.
A GEV model can be represented by a CPGF G(Y), where Y is a vector of size m with entries
Yi = e
ui , for all i∈ V. To be consistent with the RUM principle, G(·) needs to satisfy the following
properties (McFadden 1978, Ben-Akiva et al. 1985).
Remark 1 (Properties of GEV-CPGF). A GEV-CPGF G(Y) has the following properties.
(i) G(Y)≥ 0, ∀Y∈Rm,
(ii) G is homogeneous of degree one, i.e., G(λY) = λG(Y)
(iii) G(Y)→∞ if Yi→∞
(iv) Given i1, . . . , ik distinct from each other, ∂Gi1,...,ik(Y)≥ 0 if k is odd, and ≤ if k is even
(v) G(Y) =
∑
i∈V Yi∂Gi(Y)
(vi)
∑
j∈V Yj∂Gij(Y) = 0, ∀i∈ V.
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where ∂Gi(Y) = ∂G(Y)/∂Yi
Under a GEV model specified by CPGF G, given any vector Y ∈ Rm, the choice probability of
product i∈ V is given by
Pi(Y|G) = Yi∂Gi(Y)
1 +G(Y)
.
Note that the above formulation also implies that the choice probability of the non-purchase item
is P0(Y|G) = 1/(1+G(Y)). The GEV becomes the MNL model if G(Y) =
∑m
i=1 Yi, and it becomes
the nested logit model if G(Y) =
∑
n∈N
(∑
i∈Cn(σinYi)
µn
)µ/µn
, where N is the set of nests, Cn is
the set of items in nest n and σin, µ > 0, µn > 0 are the parameters of the nested logit model. In
the generalized version of the nested logit model proposed by Daly and Bierlaire (2006), called
the network GEV, the corresponding CPGF can be computed recursively based on a rooted and
cycle-free graph representing the correlation structure of the items.
Under a GEV model specified by a CPGF G(·), the deterministic version of the pricing problem
is stated as
max
x∈Rm
R(x) =
m∑
i=1
(xi− ci)Pi(Y(x,a,b)|G), (P1)
where Y(x,a,b)∈Rm with entries Yi(x,a,b) = exp(ai−bixi). The expected revenue R(x) becomes
more difficult to handle as the GEV model becomes more complicated. By leveraging the properties
of GEV models stated in Remark 1, Zhang et al. (2018) manage to show that if the PSP are
homogeneous, i.e., bi = bj for all i, j ∈ V and if x∗ is an optimal solution to (P1), then
x∗i − ci =
1
〈b〉 +R(x
∗),∀i∈ V and R(x∗) = W (γe
−1)
〈b〉 (1)
where γ =G(Y1(c1), . . . , Ym(cm)) and W (·) is the Lambert-W function. The results in (1) indeed
imply that a constant markup solution is optimal to (P1) and this constant markup can be com-
puted explicitly. Moreover, if the PSP are partition-wise homogeneous and G is separable, then
Zhang et al. (2018) show that the optimal prices have a constant markup in each partition. These
results also provide an explicit way to compute optimal prices for the pricing problem under the
MNL with arbitrary PSP. Zhang et al. (2018) also show that the expected revenue function is
concave in the purchasing probabilities under any GEV model, making the pricing problem with
expected sale constraints tractable.
3. Robust Unconstrained Pricing
In this section, we study a robust version of the unconstrained pricing problem, under the setting
that the choice parameters (a,b) are not given exactly but belong to an uncertainty set. We first
present our results for the case of homogeneous PSP. We then switch to the case of partition-
wise PSP later on. In our robust model, we aim at maximizing the worst-case expected revenue
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over all parameters in the uncertainty set. The robust unconstrained pricing problem (P1) can be
formulated as
max
x∈Rm
{
g(x) = min
(a,b)∈A
m∑
i=1
(xi− ci)Pi(Y(x,a,b)|G),
}
, (RO)
where A is the uncertainty set of the parameters (a,b). We also assume that A is compact, convex
and bounded (Assumption 1). The convexity and compactness assumptions are useful later in the
section, as we need to show that, under a constant-markup style vector of prices, the objective
function of the adversary’s problem is convex on A, which in turn helps to identify a saddle
point of the robust problem. The boundedness assumption is rational in the context, as the choice
parameters are often inferred from data and it is expected that they are finite. We also assume
that the PSP are positive, i.e., b > 0, which is rational from a behavior point of view.
Assumption 1. A is convex, compact and bounded, i.e., there exists (a,b) and (a,b) in R2m such
that (a,b) (a,b) (a,b), ∀(a,b)∈A. Moreover, assume that b 0 and b 6= 0.
3.1. Homogeneous Price Sensitivity Parameters
When the PSP are the same over all the products, we will show that the robust optimal prices have
a constant markup and this constant markup can be computed efficiently by binary search. To
prove the results, we will consider the robust unconstrained pricing problem with constant-markup
prices, i.e., we only look at prices x such that xi− ci = xj − cj for all i, j ∈A. Then we show that
there exist constant-markup prices x∗ such that if (a∗,b∗) is an optimal solution to the adversary’s
problem under prices x∗, then x∗ is also optimal to the deterministic unconstrained problem with
choice parameters (a∗,b∗). In this context, (x∗,a∗,b∗) is a saddle point of the robust problem and
we show that x∗ is also an optimal solution to the robust problem.
Given constant-markup prices x ∈ Rm and choice parameters (a,b) ∈ A, the expected revenue
becomes
m∑
i=1
(xi− ci)Pi(Y(x,a,b)|G) =
z
∑
i∈V Yi∂Gi(Y)
1 +G(Y)
= z
(
1− 1
1 +G(Y)
)
,
where z = xi− ci, ∀i ∈ V and Y is a vector with entries Yi = exp(ai− bi(z+ ci)) for all i ∈ V. As a
result, the expected revenue is a function of z and (a,b), and if (a∗(z),a∗(z)) is an optimal solution
to the adversary’s problem, then we also have
(a∗(z),b∗(z)) = argmin
a,b∈A
G(Y|z,a,b), (2)
where G(Y|z,a,b) = G(Y1, . . . , Ym) with Yi = eai−bi(z+ci). First, we show that, given z ≥ 0,
G(Y|z,a,b) is strictly convex in (a,b) and (a∗(z),b∗(z)) is always uniquely determined (Proposi-
tion 1).
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Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, given any z ∈R+, G(Y|z,a,b) is strictly convex on A and
Problem 2 always has a unique solution.
Proof: First, we consider function fG(s) :Rm→R+
fG(s) =G(Y1, . . . , Ym), where Yi = e
si , ∀i∈ V
We will prove that fG(s) is convex. Taking the first and second derivatives of fG(s) we obtain
∂fG(s)
∂si
= ∂Gi(Y)Yi,
and
∂2fG(s)
∂si∂si
= ∂Gii(Y)Y
2
i + ∂Gi(Y)Yi,
∂2fG(s)
∂si∂sj
= ∂Gij(Y)YiYj.
So we have
∇2fG(s) = diag(Y)∇2G(Y)diag(Y) + diag(∇G(Y) ◦Y),
where diag(Y) is the square diagonal matrix with the elements of vector Y on the main diagonal.
The second term diag(∇G(Y) ◦Y) is always positive definite. Moreover, diag(Y)∇2G(Y)diag(Y)
is symmetric and its (i, j)-th component is given by Yi∂Gij(Y)Yj. For i 6= j, we have ∂Gij(Y)≤
0 by the property of the GEV-CPGF G, so all off-diagonal entries of the matrix are non-
positive. In addition,
∑
j∈V Yj∂Gij(Y) = 0, so that each row of the matrix sums to zero. Thus,
diag(Y)∇2G(Y)diag(Y) is positive semi-definite (see Theorem A.6 in De Klerk 2006). So, ∇2fG(s)
is positive definite, or equivalently, fG(s) is strictly convex in s. This lead to the following inequality,
for all s1, s2 ∈Rm and λ∈ (0,1)
λfG(s1) +λfG(s2)> fG(λs1 + (1−λ)s2).
For all (a1,b1), (a2,b2)∈A, replace s1i by a1i − b1i (z+ ci) and s2i by a2i − b2i (z+ ci) we have
λG(Y|z,a1,b1) +λG(Y|z,a2,b2)>G(Y|z,λa1 + (1−λ)a2, λb1 + (1−λ)b2), ∀λ∈ (0,1)
which means that G(Y|z,a,b) is strictly convex in a,b. This completes the proof. 
Next, we further show that (a∗(z),b∗(z)) determined in (2) are not only unique given any z ≥ 0,
but also are continuous in z (Lemma 1).
Lemma 1. (a∗(z),b∗(z)) determined in (2) is continuous in z ∈R+.
Proof: This is a direct result from Proposition 1, i.e., (a∗(z),b∗(z) are uniquely determined, and
the Corollary 8.2 of Hogan (1973). 
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In the next lemma, we show that, given any z ∈ R+, if the uncertainty set A is bounded, the
the function G(Y|z,a,b) is also bounded for all parameters (a,b) ∈ A. The lemma allows us to
determine an finite interval where we can search the robust optimal constant markup.
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1 we have
G(Y|z,a,b)≤G(Y|z,a,b)≤G(Y|z,a,b), ∀z ∈R+, (a,b)∈A.
Proof: Again, consider fG(s) =G(Y1, . . . , Ym), where Yi = e
si , ∀i= 1, . . . ,m. Taking the derivative
of fG(s) w.r.t. si we have
∂fG(s)
∂si
= ∂Gi(Y)Yi ≥ 0
So, fG(s) is monotonic in every coordinate, meaning that given any s, s0 ∈ Rm, s  s0, we have
fG(s)≥ fG(s0). Moreover, it is clear from Assumption 1 that
a−b ◦ (c+ ze) a−b ◦ (c+ ze) a−b ◦ (c+ ze), ∀z ∈R+, (a,b)∈A.
So, we obtain the following inequality
G(Y|z,a,b)≤G(Y|z,a,b)≤G(Y|z,a,b), ∀(a,b)∈A,
which completes the proof. 
Proposition 2 below is a key result of this section where we show that there is a constant
markup z∗ such that if we solve the corresponding adversary’s problem under z∗ and obtain a
solution (a∗(z),b∗(z)), then z∗ is also the optimal constant markup for the deterministic pricing
problem under parameters (a∗(z),b∗(z)). In other words, we show that there exist z∗ ∈ R+ such
that (z∗+ c,a∗(z),b∗(z)) is a saddle point of the robust problem.
Proposition 2. For any i∈ V, there exists z∗ ∈R+ such that
z∗ =
1 +W (τ(z∗))
〈b∗(z∗)〉 ∈
[
Z0,Z
0
]
where
Z0 =
1 +W (G(Y|0,a,b)e−1)
〈b〉
Z
0
=
1 +W (G(Y|0,a,b)e−1)
〈b〉
τ(z∗) =G(Y|0,a∗(z∗),b∗(z∗))e−1
and W (·) is the is the Lambert-W function.
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Proof: Let
f(z) = z− 1 +W (τ(z))〈b∗(z)〉 .
From Lemma 2, we have the following chain of inequalities
Z0 ≤ 1 +W (τ(z))〈b∗(z)〉 ≤Z
0
, ∀z ∈R+.
Which means
f(Z0)≤ 0; f(Z0)≥ 0
Since f(z) is continuous in z (Lemma 1), equation f(z) = 0 always has a solution in the interval[
Z0,Z
0
]
. 
In Proposition 2, we make use of the boundedness assumption on A to identify an interval
where we can find z∗. Without this assumption, one can simply choose 0 as a lower bound, as
f(0) is always less than 0. However, to identify an upper bound, one needs some limits from the
uncertainty set. This is because even in the deterministic case, if the choice parameters b approach
zero, or a increase to infinity, then the optimal constant markup will go to infinity (see Equation
1 for details).
We are now ready to establish the main result of the section. Theorem 1 below shows that the
robust optimal prices have a constant markup and it provides a formula to compute this constant
markup by binary search. The proof of the theorem is quite obvious, as we already show that there
isa saddle point of the robust problem that has the constant-markup style (Lemma 2).
Theorem 1. (Constant markup is optimal to the robust problem when the PSP are
homogeneous). Assume that Assumption 1 holds and the PSP are homogeneous, i.e., for any
(a,b) ∈ A, bi = bj, ∀i, j = 1, . . . ,m, then xRO∗ defined below is the unique optimal solution of the
robust problem (RO)
xRO∗i = z
RO∗+ ci, ∀i= 1, . . . ,m (3)
where zRO∗ ∈R+ is the unique value of z satisfying
z =
1 +W (G(Y|0,a∗(z),b∗(z))e−1)
〈b∗(z)〉 , (4)
where W (·) is the Lambert-W function.
Proof: To prove that xRO∗ is optimal to the robust problem, we will show that g(xRO∗)≥ g(x) for
all x∈Rm. Let us first define
Φ(x,a,b) =
m∑
i=1
(xi− ci)Pi(Y(x,a,b)|G) (5)
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Given xRO∗ and zRO∗ defined in (3) and (4), we first remark that (a∗(zRO∗),b∗(zRO∗)) is also the
unique solution of the adversary’s problem
argmin
(a,b)∈A
Φ(xRO∗,a,b)
So, g(xRO∗) = Φ(xRO∗,a∗(zRO∗),b∗(zRO∗)). Using the results from Zhang et al. (2018) and according
to the way xRO∗ is computed, xRO∗ is optimal to the following problem
max
x∈Rm
Φ(x,a∗(zRO∗),b∗(zRO∗)).
This leads to the following inequalities, for any x∈Rm,
g(xRO∗) = Φ(xRO∗,a∗(zRO∗),b∗(zRO∗))
≥Φ(x,a∗(zRO∗),b∗(zRO∗)) (6)
≥ min
(a,b)∈A
Φ(x,a,b)
= g(x).
So, g(xRO∗)≥ g(x) for all x∈Rm, i.e., xRO∗ is an optimal solution to the robust problem.
Note that the deterministic version of the unconstrained pricing problem always has a unique
solution, which is the constant markup one (Zhang et al. 2018). So, the inequality in (6) is strict
if x 6= xRO∗. In other words, g(xRO∗)> g(x) if x 6= xRO∗, meaning that there is only one solution to
the robust pricing problem (RO) and there is only solution to the equation (4), as required. 
Theorem 1 implies that a solution to the robust problem can be found by solving the equation
1 +W (G(Y|0,a∗(z),b∗(z))e−1)
〈b∗(z)〉 − z = 0, (7)
in the interval
[
Z0,Z
0
]
, in which Z0,Z
0
are defined in Lemma 2. This could be done efficiently via
binary search. In comparison with its deterministic counter part, the robust problem would requires
about log2
(
(Z
0−Z0)
)
/) steps to obtain a constant markup that is in the -neighbourhood of
the optimal constant markup, while the deterministic problem requires one step to get its optimal
solution.
Theorem 1 also allows us to give comparative statistics that describe how the robust optimal
value and the optimal prices change as a function of the size of the uncertainty set. To facilitate
our exposition, let us denote by Γ(A) the optimal value of the robust problem (RO) andby x∗(A)
the robust constant markup given by Theorem 1. We also need the following definition and lemma
to establish the comparative results.
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Definition 1. An uncertainty set A is called “separated-by-price-sensitivity-parameters”
if A is a Cartesian product of two uncertainty sets of a and b, i.e., A= {(a,b)| a ∈Aa ⊂Rm,b ∈
Ab ⊂Rm+}.
Lemma 3. Assume that the PSP are homogeneous, given an uncertainty set A, satisfying Assump-
tion 1 and the “ separated-by-price-sensitivity-parameters”
Property 1. , then the set A can be represented as A = Aa × Ab where Ab = {b|bi = bj ∈
[b, b],∀i, j ∈ [m]}, where b, b∈R+, and x∗(A)i = ci + 1/b+ Γ(A).
Proof: Since the PSP are homogeneous and the uncertainty sets are compact, there always exists
b, b ∈ R+, b ≤ b such that Ab = {b|bi = bj ∈ [b, b]}. Moreover, from Theorem 1, the robust opti-
mal prices x∗(A) is constant markup, i.e., ∃z∗ ∈ R+ such that x∗(A)i − ci = z∗. Let (a∗,b∗) =
argmin(a,b)∈AG(Y|z∗,a,b). Using the result that fG(s) = G(ee1 , . . . , eem) is monotonic in every
coordinate of s ∈ Rm (Lemma 2) and (a∗,b∗) is always uniquely determined (Proposition 1), we
can show that b∗i = b, for all i∈ [m]. So, from Theorem 1 and Proposition 3.2 of Zhang et al. (2018)
we obtain
x∗(A)i− ci = z∗ = 1
b
+
W (G(Y|0,a∗,b∗)e−1)
b
=
1
b
+ Γ(A), ∀i∈ [m],
which is the desired result. 
In the next proposition, we show that if the uncertainty set becomes larger, then we obtain
smaller robust expected value and the robust prices decreases as well.
Proposition 3. (Larger uncertainty set leads to smaller robust expected revenue and
smaller robust optimal prices). If the PSP are homogeneous, then given two convex uncertainty
sets A1,A2 satisfying Assumption 1 such that A1 ⊂A2, we have Γ(A1)≥ Γ(A2). Moreover, if A1
and A2 are “ separated-by-price-sensitivity-parameters”, then x∗(A1) x∗(A2).
Proof: For notational convenience, we denote the objective value of the adversary as g(x|A) =
min(a,b)∈A
∑
i(xi− ci)Pi(Y(x,a,b)|G). It is obvious that g(x|A1)≥ g(x|A2) for any x∈Rm+ , so we
have
g(x∗(A2)|A2)≤ g(x∗(A2)|A1)≤ g(x∗(A1)|A1),
which means Γ(A1)≥ Γ(A2), as required.
Now, assume that the uncertainty sets A1 and A2 are “separated-by-price-sensitivity-
parameters”. Using Lemma 3, we can write A1 =Aa1×Ab1 where Ab1 = {b|bi = bj ∈ [b1, b1], ∀i, j},
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and A2 =Aa2 ×Ab2 where Ab2 = {b|bi = bj ∈ [b2, b2], ∀i, j}, where b1, b1, b2, b2 are non-negative con-
stants such that b1 ≤ b1 and b2 ≤ b2. From Theorem 1 we can write
x∗(A1)i = ci + 1
b1
+ Γ(A1), ∀i∈ [m]
x∗(A2)i = ci + 1
b2
+ Γ(A2), ∀i∈ [m].
Moreover, since A1 ⊂A2, we have b1 ≤ b2. Using the result Γ(A1)≥ Γ(A2) we have x∗(A1) x∗(A2),
which completes the proof. 
The proof of Proposition 3 contains more information than the proposition itself, as we we can
write x∗(A1)i−x∗(A2)i = 1b1 −
1
b2
+Γ(A1)−Γ(A2)≥ 1b1 −
1
b2
, which indicates that if we increase the
upper bound of the PSP in the uncertainty set, the robust optimal prices will strictly decrease.
3.2. Partially Heterogeneous Price Sensitivity Parameters
In this section, we try to relax the assumption that the PSP are homogeneous. Similar to the
deterministic version considered in Zhang et al. (2018), we need additional assumptions to derive
solutions to the robust problem. More precisely, we require that the products can be partitioned
into disjoint subsets, the generating function is separable by the partitions, and the products in
each partition share the same price sensitivity parameter. We partition the set of all products V
into N non-empty subsets V1, . . . ,VN such that V =
⋃N
n=1 Vn and Vi ∩ Vj = ∅, ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ [N ].
Moreover, we separate the vector Y into sub-vectors Y1, . . . ,YN such that Yn = {Yi| i ∈ Vn} for
all n ∈ [N ]. We also separate vector (a,b) ∈ R2m+ into sub-vectors (a1,b1), . . . , (aN ,bN) such that
(an,bn) = {(ai, bi)| i∈ Vn}, ∀n∈ [N ]. Let denote by An ⊂A the uncertainty set for the sub-vector
(an,bn), for any n∈ [N ]. We further assume that the GEV-CPGF G(Y) can be separated into N
GEV-CPGFs as
G(Y) =
N∑
n=1
Gn(Yn).
In this context, we need to further assume that the uncertainty set is rectangular, because of
the following reason. When the PSP is not homogeneous, the optimal prices to the deterministic
pricing problem do not have a single constant markup over all products (Zhang et al. 2018). As a
consequence, the robust optimal prices to (RO) would generally not have a single constant markup
over all the products. Moreover, if the prices do not have constant-markup style as in the previous
section, the corresponding adversary’s problem would be non-concave in (a,b) and solutions to
the adversary’s problem may be not unique. For this reason, we can not apply the techniques
used in the previous version to identify a saddle point of the the robust problem. Furthermore,
in Proposition 5 below, we show that under a general uncertainty set, a partition-wise constant-
markup solution would be optimal to the robust problem, but such a solution may not exist or
may not be tractable to obtain.
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Assumption 2. The PSP are homogeneous in each subset Vn, n∈ [N ], and the uncertainty set A
is rectangular, i.e., A= {(a,b)| a∈ [a,a], b∈ [b,b], bi = bj, ∀i, j ∈ Vn, ∀n} .
To deal with the robust problem in this context, we first consider the problem where we only seek
prices that have a constant markup in each partition, i.e., x ∈ Rm such that xi − ci = xj − cj for
all i, j ∈ Vn, n ∈ [N ]. Similar to the previous section, we will show that there is a solution x∗ of
this style such that if (a∗,b∗) is an optimal solution to the adversary’s problem under prices x∗,
then (x∗,a,b) is a saddle point of the robust problem and x∗ is a robust optimal solution. In this
context, Assumption 2 allows us to characterize solutions of the adversary’s problem under the
robust optimal prices. In brief, we show in the following that if the uncertainty set is rectangular,
then under any prices that have a constant markup in each partition, there is an adversary solution
whose each coordinate is equal to either its upper bound or its lower bound. Then, we show
that if the vector of prices is optimal to the robust problem, then there is an solution to the
corresponding adversary’s problem (a∗,b∗) such that a∗ is equal to its lower bound and b∗ is
equal to its upper bound, which is nice because it allows us to convert the robust problem into an
equivalent deterministic one.
Consider a robust pricing problem, in which we require the prices x to have a constant markup
in each partition, i.e., xi − ci = xj − cj for all i, j ∈ Vn, n ∈ [N ]. Let zn = xi − ci for all i ∈ Vn and
n∈ [N ]. The robust problem becomes
max
z∈RN
 min(a,b)∈A ∑
n∈[N ]
∑
i∈Vn
znPi(Y
n(zn + c,a,b)|Gn)
 ,
or equivalently
max
z∈RN
{
min
(a,b)∈A
∑
n∈[N ] znG
n(Yn|zn,a,b)
1 +
∑
n∈[N ]G
n(Yn|zn,a,b)
}
, (8)
where Gn(Yn|z,a,b) =Gn(Yi, i ∈ Vn) with Yi = eai−bi(zn+ci), for all i ∈ Vn. For notational brevity,
let
ρ(z,a,b) =
∑
n∈[N ] znG
n(Yn|zn,a,b)
1 +
∑
n∈[N ]G
n(Yn|zn,a,b) .
In Lemma 4 below, we show that if we aim at maximizing function Gn(Y n|zn,an,bn), for any
n ∈ [N ], over the uncertainty set A, then we can pick the upper bound vector of an and lower
bound vector of bn. On the other hand, if the goal is to minimize Gn(Y n|zn,an,bn), we can just
take the lower bound vector of an and upper bound vector of bn. The role of this lemma is to
support the following lemma where we show that if (a∗,b∗) is optimal to the adversary problem,
then each coordinate of (a∗,b∗) is equal to either its upper bound or its lower bound.
Mai T. and Jaillet P.: Robust Multi-product Pricing under General Extreme Value Models
Article submitted; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!) 17
Lemma 4. Assume that Assumption 2 holds, given any n ∈ [N ], if (an∗,bn∗) is a solution to the
maximization problem max(an,bn)∈AnGn(Y
n|z,an,bn), then an∗ = an and bn∗ = bn. On the other
hand, if (an∗,bn∗) is a solution to minimization problem min(an,bn)∈AnGn(Y
n|z,an,bn), then an∗ =
an and bn∗ = b
n
, where an,an,b
n
,an are sub-vectors of a,a,b,b, respectively.
Proof: Using the same technique as in the proof of Lemma 2, we can show that function fGn(s) =
Gn(Yn(s)), where Yi(s) = e
si , ∀i ∈ Vn, is a monotonically increasing function in every coordinate.
Since An is rectangular and Gn(Yn|z,an,bn) = Gn(Yi = eai−bi(z+ci)| i ∈ Vn), we easily have the
following result
Gn(Yn|z,an,bn)≥Gn(Yn|z,an,bn), ∀(an,bn)∈An,
Or, equivalently,
(an,bn) = argmax(an,bn)∈AnG
n(Yn|z,an,bn) (9)
Moreover, from Proposition 1, we know that Gn(Yn|z,an,bn) is strictly convex in An, mean-
ing that (an,bn) is the unique solution of the maximization problem in (9). By a simi-
lar way, we can also show that (an,b
n
) is the unique solution to the minimization problem
min(an,bn)∈AnGn(Y
n|z,an,bn). This completes the proof. 
Lemma 5 below shows that under any prices, one of the vector in {(a,b)∈A| ai ∈ {ai, ai}, bi ∈
{bi, bi}} is optimal to the adversary’s problem, which also means that we can solve the adversary
problem by searching over 2m+n possible solutions. This lemma is an important step towards the
result showing that under the robust optimal prices, vector (a,b) is optimal to the adversary’s
problem.
Lemma 5. Assume that Assumption 2 holds and let (a∗,b∗) be a solution to the corresponding
adversary’s problem of (8), then for any n∈ [N ], we have
(a∗i , b
∗
i ) =
{
(ai, bi) if ρ(z,a
∗,b∗)< zn
(ai, bi) if ρ(z,a
∗,b∗)> zn
∀i∈ Vn.
Moreover, if ρ(z,a∗,b∗) = zn then all the solutions in the following set are optimal to the adversary’s
problem
S∗ = {(a,b)∈A| (aj, bj) = (a∗j , b∗j ),∀j /∈ Vn}
Proof: We denote (an∗,bn∗) as the sub-vectors of (a∗,b∗) associated with partition n-th, i.e.,
(an∗,bn∗) = {(a∗i , b∗i ), i∈ Vn}. Now, given any n∈ [N ], let
A=
∑
n′∈[N ],n′ 6=n
znG
n(Yn|zn,a∗,b∗)
B = 1 +
∑
n′∈[N ],n′ 6=n
Gn(Yn|zn,a∗,b∗).
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We can write
ρ(z,a∗,b∗) =
A+ znG
n(Yn|zn,a∗,b∗)
B+Gn(Yn|zn,a∗,b∗)
We now prove the lemma by considering the following three cases:
(i) If ρ(z,a∗,b∗) < zn, then for any γ < Gn(Y
n|zn,a∗,b∗) one can easily show the following
inequality
ρ(z,a∗,b∗) =
A+ znG
n(Yn|zn,a∗,b∗)
B+Gn(Yn|zn,a∗,b∗) >
A+ znγ
B+ γ
Since (a∗,b∗) is a solution to the adversary problem (8),(an∗,bn∗) must be a solution to the
minimization problem min(an,bn)∈AnGn(Y
n|zn,an,bn). According to Lemma 4, we have (a∗i , b∗i ) =
(ai, bi) for all i∈ Vn.
(ii) If ρ(z,a∗,b∗) > zn, then similarly to the previous case, we can show that, for any γ >
Gn(Yn|zn,a∗,b∗) one can easily show the following inequality
ρ(z,a∗,b∗)>
A+ znγ
B+ γ
.
Thus, (an∗,bn∗) must be a solution to the maximization problem max(an,bn)∈AnGn(Y
n|zn,an,bn).
Again, using Lemma 4, we have (a∗i , b
∗
i ) = (ai, bi) for all i∈ Vn.
(iii) If ρ(z,a∗,b∗) = zn, then for any γ ∈R we have
ρ(z,a∗,b∗) =
A+ znγ
B+ γ
,
meaning that any solution (a,b) ∈ A such that (ai, bi) = (a∗i , b∗i ), for all i 6= Vn, is optimal to the
adversary problem (8).
Combining the above three cases, we obtain the desired result. 
Since we want to prove that under robust optimal prices z∗, the solution (a,b) should be optimal
to the adversary’s problem, Lemma 5 tells us that we need to show ρ(z∗,a,b)≤ z∗n for all n∈ [N ].
Before presenting this result, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Given z∈RN , (a,b)∈A and k ∈ [N ], if ρ(z,a,b)≥ zk, then
∂ρ(z,a,b)
∂zk
∣∣∣∣
z=z
> 0.
Proof: For notational brevity, let A =
∑
n∈[N ] znG
n(Yn|zn,a,b) and B = 1 +∑
n∈[N ]G
n(Yn|zn,a,b). Taking the first derivative of ρ(z,a,b) w.r.t. zk we obtain
∂ρ(z,a,b)
∂zk
∣∣∣∣
z=z
=
(
Gk(zk,a,b)− zk
∑
i∈Vk biYi∂G
k
i (Y
k)
)
B+A
(∑
i∈Vk biYi∂G
k
i (Y
k)
)
B2
=
1
B2
(
Gk(zk,a,b) +
(∑
i∈Vk
biYi∂G
k
i (Y
k)
)
(A− zkB)
)
> 0.
The last inequality is due to ρ(z,a,b) =A/B ≥ zk. 
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We are now ready to show that (a,b) is an optimal solution to the adversary’s problem under
the robust optimal prices (Lemma 7).
Lemma 7. Under Assumption 2, (a,b) is the unique optimal solution to the adversary’s problem
of (8) under robust optimal prices.
Proof: Let z∗ be an optimal solution to (8), we first prove that (a,b) is optimal to the adversary’s
problem under z∗. Let A∗ be the set of optimal solutions to the adversary’s problem of (8) under
z∗, i.e.,
A∗ = argmin
(a,b)∈A
ρ(z∗,a,b).
Let also f(z) = argmin(a,b)∈A ρ(z,a,b). We will prove that f(z
∗)< z∗n for all n ∈ [N ]. By contra-
diction, assume that there exists a set n∈ [N ] such that ρ(x∗,a∗,b∗)≥ z∗n. Let
k= argmax{z∗n| n∈ [N ], f(z∗)> z∗n}
h= argmin{z∗n| n∈ [N ], f(z∗)< z∗n}.
Indeed, h always exists because ρ(z∗,a∗,b∗)<maxn∈[N ] z∗n. We consider two following cases
(i) If such k exists. We have z∗h > ρ(z
∗,a∗,b∗)> z∗k and for any n 6= h and n 6= k we have either
ρ(z∗,a∗,b∗) = z∗n or z
∗
k ≥ z∗n or z∗h ≤ z∗n. Moreover, the function f(z) is continuous in x (Theorem 7,
Hogan 1973). So, there is δ > 0 such that
z∗h > f(z
∗+ tek)> z∗k + t, ∀t∈ [0, δ],
where ek is a vector of size N with zero entries except the k-th element is equal to 1. As a result,
for any n∈ [N ] such that z∗n ≥ z∗h we have z∗n > f(z∗+ tek) and if z∗n ≤ z∗k we have z∗n < f(z∗+ tek).
From Lemma (5), this means that there is a solution (a∗,b∗)∈A∗ that is optimal to the adversary’s
problem {argmin(a,b)∈Aρ(z∗+ tek,a,b)}, for all t∈ [0, δ]. This leads to
f(z∗+ tek) = ρ(z∗+ tek,a∗,b∗)≤ ρ(z∗,a∗,b∗), ∀t∈ [0, δ],
which is contradictory to the result of Lemma 6, which says that the partial derivative of
ρ(z∗,a∗,b∗) is positive.
(ii) If such k does not exist, we also have that for any n∈ [N ], either f(z∗)< z∗h ≤ z∗n or f(z∗) = z∗n.
Similar to the previous case, we also have the result that there exists δ > 0 such that z∗h > f(a
∗+tek)
for all t ∈ (0, δ), which also leads to the result that there is (a∗,b∗) ∈ A∗ being optimal to the
adversary’s problem under z∗ + tek. Using Lemma 6, there is t ∈ (0, δ] such that ρ(z∗,a∗,b∗) <
ρ(z∗+ tek,a∗,b∗) = f(z∗+ tek), which is contradictory to our initial assumption that a∗ is optimal
to the robust problem.
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So in summary, we can claim that f(z∗)< z∗n, for all n ∈ [N ] and Lemma 5 tells us that (a,b) is
the unique optimal solution to the adversary’s problem of (8), which is the desired result. 
Lemma 8. The robust problem (8) is equivalent to maxz ρ(z,a,b).
Proof: We use the same notations as in the proof of Lemma 7. We need to prove that if z∗ is an
robust optimal solution to (8), then it is also optimal to maxz ρ(z,a,b). To facilitate our exposition,
let A= {(a,b)| ai ∈ {ai, ai} and bi ∈ {bi, bi}} (i.e. A contains points whose each coordinate is either
equal to its lower bound or upper bound). We also define
τ = min
(a,b)∈A
{
ρ(z∗,a,b)− ρ(z∗,a,b)
∣∣∣ ρ(z∗,a,b)>ρ(z∗,a,b)} (10)
Now, by contradiction, assume that z∗ /∈maxz ρ(z,a,b). since the problem maxz ρ(z,a,b) has a
unique local optimum (Theorem C.1 in Zhang et al. (2018)), ∇zρ(z∗,a,b) 6= 0. Thus, there always
exits a vector  ∈Rn 6= 0 and a constant δ > 0 such that
ρ(z∗,a,b)<ρ(z∗+ t,a,b),∀t∈ (0, δ). (11)
Moreover, since f(z) and ρ(z,a,b) are continuous in z (Theorem 7, Hogan 1973), we can choose
t∈ (0, δ) such that {
|f(z∗)− f(z∗+ t)|< τ/2
|ρ(z∗,at,bt)− ρ(z∗+ t,at,bt)|< τ/2 (12)
where (at,bt) is an optimal solution to the adversary’s problem under prices z∗+ t. From Lemma
5 we can choose (at,bt)∈A. By the selection of t in (12) we have
|ρ(z∗,a,b)− ρ(z∗,at,bt)| ≤ |ρ(z∗,a− ρ(z∗+ t,at,bt)|+ |ρ(z∗+ t,at,bt)− ρ(z∗,at,bt)|< τ.
Combine with the definition of τ in (10), we have that (at,bt) is also an optimal solution to the
adversary’s problem under z∗. Lemma 5 tells us that (a,b) is the unique optimal solution to the
adversary’s problem under z∗, so we have (at,bt) = (a,b). Combine with (11) we have f(z∗) <
f(z∗+ t), which is contradictory to the assumption that z∗ is optimal to the robust problem (8).
This completes the proof. 
Now we are ready for the main result. The following theorem shows that there is a partition-wise
constant markup solution that is optimal to the robust problem (RO). This is a direct outcome
from Lemmas 7 and (8).
Theorem 2. (If the PSP are partition-wise homogeneous, a partition-wise constant
markup solution is optimal). Assume that Assumption 2 holds and let R∗ be the unique solution
of the equation
R=
∑
n∈[N ]
1
〈bn〉e
−〈bn〉R−1Gn(Yn|0,a,b)
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then x∗ ∈Rm such that x∗i = ci + 1/〈b
n〉+R∗, ∀i∈ Vn, ∀n∈ [N ], is the unique optimal solution to
the robust problem (RO).
Proof: According to Theorem C.1 of Zhang et al. (2018) we see that x∗ is also an optimal solution
the problem maxx Φ(x,a,b). Moreover, if we define z
∗ ∈ RN such that z∗n = x∗i − ci for all n ∈
[N ], i∈ Vn, then z∗ is also optimal to the problem maxz ρ(z,a,b). Hence, z∗ is also a robust optimal
solution to (8) (Lemma 8). As a result, from Lemma 7 we see that (a,b) is an optimal solution
to the adversary’s problem of (RO) under prices x∗. So, we have g(x∗) = Φ(x∗,a,b) (recall that
g(x) is the adversary’s optimal objective value under prices x ∈Rm). Under the assumption that
the PSP are homogeneous in each partition Vn, Zhang et al. (2018) (Theorem C.1) show that x∗
is also optimal to the deterministic problem
max
x∈Rm
Φ(x,a,b).
So, for any x∈Rm, we have
g(x∗) = Φ(x∗,a,b)≥Φ(x,a,b)
≥ min
(a,b)∈A
Φ(x,a,b) = g(x).
So, g(x∗) ≥ g(x) for all x ∈ Rm. Moreover, if x 6= x∗, then from Zhang et al. (2018) we have
Φ(x∗,a,b) > Φ(x,a,b), which means g(x∗) > g(x). So, x∗ is the unique optimal solution to the
robust problem, as required. 
Theorem 2 indicates that to solve the robust problem under a rectangular uncertainty set and
partition-wise PSP, we just need to pick (a,b) for the choice parameters and solve the corresponding
deterministic pricing problem. Thus, the robust problem in this context is not difficult to solve as
compared to the deterministic counterpart.
In the next two corollaries, we provide formulas to compute the robust optimal prices for the
case of the MNL and nested logit models. These formulas are a direct result from Theorem 2 and
generalize previous studies on the pricing problem under the MNL and nested logit models (Keller
2013, Li and Huh 2011).
Corollary 1. (Robust solutions for the MNL-based robust pricing problem with het-
erogeneous price sensitivity parameters). If the choice model is MNL, the PSP are heteroge-
neous over products and the uncertainty set is rectangular, i.e., A= {(a,b)| a ∈ [a,a], b ∈ [b,b]},
then x∗ defined below is an optimal solution to the robust problem (RO): x∗i = ci +
1
/
bi +R
∗, where
R∗ is a unique value of R satisfying R=
∑
n∈[N ]
1
bi
exp(ai− bi(ci +R)− 1).
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If the choice model is a nested-logit model of N nests with GEV-CPGF function
G(Y) =
N∑
n=1
(∑
i∈Vn
σinY
µn
i
)µ/µn
, (13)
where µ,µn > 0, σin, ∀n∈ [N ], i∈ Vn, are some model parameters.
Corollary 2. (Robust solutions for the robust pricing problem under nested-logit when
the PSP are partially heterogeneous). If the choice model is a nested-logit with GEV-CPGF
(13), the PSP are homogeneous in each nest and the uncertainty set is rectangular, i.e., A =
{(a,b)| a ∈ [a,a], b ∈ [b,b]}, then x∗ defined below is an optimal solution to the robust problem
(RO): x∗i = ci + 1/〈b
n〉+R∗,∀i∈ Vn, n= 1, . . . ,N, where R∗ is a unique value of R satisfying
R=
∑
n∈[N ]
1
〈bn〉
(∑
i∈Vn
σine
(ai−〈b
n〉ci)µn
)µ/µn
e−〈b
n〉R−1.
We also give some comparative insights that describe how the robust optimal value and solution
change as a function of the uncertainty set. To facilitate the comparison, let x˜
∗
(A) denote the
robust solution given in Theorem 2, the following theorem shows that, in case that the PSP are
partition-wise homogeneous, a larger uncertainty set leads to smaller robust prices.
Proposition 4. (When the PSP are partition-wise homogeneous, larger uncertainty set
leads to smaller robust optimal prices). Given two convex uncertainty set A1,A2 satisfying
Assumption 2, if A1 ⊂A2, then Γ(A1)≥ Γ(A2) and x˜∗(A1) x˜∗(A2).
Proof: Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, the inequality Γ(A1) ≥ Γ(A2) is easy to verify. To
prove the inequality associated with the optimal prices, we write A1 = {(a,b)| a ∈ [a1,a1], b ∈
[b1,b
1
]} and A2 = {(a,b)| a ∈ [a2,a2], b ∈ [b2,b2]}. For each partition n ∈ [N ], let b1,n and b2,n
be the corresponding sub-vectors of b
1
and b
2
, respectively. Using the results from Theorem 2 and
Theorem C.1 of Zhang et al. (2018), we can show that, for any partition n∈ [N ],
x˜
∗
(A1)i = ci + 1〈b1,n〉
+ Γ(A1), ∀i∈ Vn
x˜
∗
(A2)i = ci + 1〈b2,n〉
+ Γ(A2), ∀i∈ Vn.
Moreover, since A1 ⊂A2, we have 〈b1,n〉 ≤ 〈b2,n〉. Using the inequality Γ(A1)≥ Γ(A2), we obtain
the desired result x˜
∗
(A1) x˜∗(A2) 
The proof of Proposition 4 also tells us that x˜
∗
(A1)i − x˜∗(A2)i ≥ 1/〈b1,n〉 − 1/〈b2,n〉, meaning
that the robust price of each item will strictly decrease if we increase the upper bound of its PSP
in the uncertainty set.
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In Proposition 5 below, we try to relax Assumption 2, i.e., the rectangularity of the uncertainty
set. In general, if the uncertainty set is not rectangular, we are able to show that there might be
a vector of partition-wise constant markup prices being optimal to the robust problem. However,
such a vector might not exist due to the fact that the adversary’s problem is no-longer convex.
Proposition 5. If there exist z∗ ∈RN , a∗,b∗ ∈Rm, and R∗ ∈R+ such that
(a∗,b∗) = argmax(a,b)∈Aρ(z
∗,a,b) (14)
R∗ =
∑
n∈[N ]
1
〈bn∗〉e
−〈bn∗〉R∗−1Gn(Yn|0,a∗,b∗) (15)
z∗i =
1
〈bn∗〉 +R
∗, ∀i∈ Vn, n∈ [N ], (16)
then vector x∗ = c+ z∗ is an optimal solution to the robust problem (8).
Proof: Using Theorem C.1 in Zhang et al. (2018), we see that x∗ is an optimal solution to the
deterministic problem maxx∈Rm ρ(x,a∗,b
∗). Thus, we have the following chain of inequalities for
any price vector x∈Rm
g(x∗) = ρ(z∗,a∗,b∗)
≥ ρ(x− c,a∗,b∗)
≥ min
(a,b)∈A
ρ(x− c,a,b)
= g(x),
which implies that x∗ is optimal to the robust problem (8), as desired. 
Proposition 5 suggests that we might solve the robust problem in (8) under a general uncertainty
set by solving the system of equations (14)-(16). However, this is not computational tractable, as
the function ρ(z∗,a,b) in (14) is not convex in (a,b) under the heterogeneity setting, even when
the choice model is MNL. Note that when there is only one partition (the PSP are homogeneous),
Proposition 5 becomes Theorem 1. In this context, the function ρ(z∗,a,b) is strictly convex in
(a,b) and there always exist z∗,a∗,b∗ satisfying (14)-(16). Furthermore, if the uncertainty set A is
rectangular (Assumption 2), then we have shown that (a∗,b∗) can be determined under the optimal
constant markups z∗, and Proposition 5 becomes Theorem 2. In the case that the uncertainty set
is singleton, the proposition becomes Theorem C.1 in Zhang et al. (2018).
4. Robust Pricing with Over-expected-sale Penalties
Motivated by applications in inventory considerations (Gallego and Hu 2014), we are interested
in a robust model for the pricing problem with expected sale requirements under uncertain choice
parameters (a,b). Given the fact that there may be no fixed prices such that the corresponding
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expected sale constraints are always satisfied when the choice parameters vary in the uncertainty
set, (see Appendix A), we propose the version with over-expected-sale penalties, which allows us
to handle both the expected sale requirements and the uncertainty issue. Our idea is to put the
expected sale constraints to the objective function, i.e., we do not force the purchase probabilities to
be in a feasible set, but instead we add penalties for purchase probabilities violating the constraints.
More precisely, we consider the objective function Φ(x,a,b)−∑Tt=1 λtmax{0, (αt)Tp− rt}, where
λt ≥ 0, t= 1, . . . , T , are penalty parameters. In this objective function, if a constraint is violated,
i.e., (αt)Tp> rt, then a cost −λtmax{0, (αt)Tp− rt} is added to the expected revenue. In general,
if we choose λt large enough, we will need a vector of purchase probabilities satisfying all the
expected sale constraints to obtain high objective values. The deterministic pricing problem under
the above objective function is
max
x∈Rm
{
Φ(x,a,b)−
T∑
t=1
λtmax{0, (αt)Tp− rt}
}
, (17)
which can be formulated as the convex optimization problem
max
p,y
∑
i∈V
(x(p|a,b,G)i− ci)pi−
T∑
t=1
λtyt (18)
subject to (αt)Tp− yt ≤ rt∑
i∈V
pi ≤ 1
p,y≥ 0.
Before moving to a robust version, we investigate some characteristics of the deterministic pricing
problem with penalties (18). First, let us denote by v∗ and p∗ the optimal value and optimal solution
of the standard pricing problem under expected sale constraints (28) and vλ and pλ the optimal
value and optimal solution to the pricing problem with over-expected-sale penalties (18). Theorem
3 below shows that the expected value given by (18) will converges to the optimal expected revenue
given by the constrained pricing problem (28) when λt, ∀t∈ [T ], increase to infinity.
Theorem 3. For any  > 0, we have
(i) For any λ1,λ2 ∈RT+ such that λ1−λ2 = 1,∑
t
max{0, (αt)Tpλ1 − rt} ≤
∑
t
max{0, (αt)Tpλ2 − rt},
where 1 is a unit vector of appropriate size.
(ii) vλ ≥ v∗ for all λ ∈RT+ and if λ0 = mint∈[T ] λt ≥ (∆∗−v∗)/ then
∑
tmax{0, (αt)Tpλ−rt} ≤ ,
where ∆∗ = maxx Φ(x,a,b).
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(iii) Assume that there are positive constant Li, li, i ∈ V such that Yi∂Gi(Y) is bounded from
above by LiY
li
i for all prices x≥ 0, then for any  such that
≤min
t,i
{αti| αti > 0}min
t
{
rt
(αt)T1
}
,
then if we choose λ0 ≥ (∆∗− v∗)/, we can upper-bound |vλ − v∗| as
|vλ − v∗| ≤max
{
max
i
{
ai
bi
− 1
bili
log
δ()
Li
}
,0
}
m
mint,i{αti| αti > 0}
,
where δ() = mint
{
rt
(αt)T1
}
− 
mint,i{αti| αti>0}
, and this upper bound converges to zero linearly when
 tends to zero.
The proof of Theorem 3 can be found in Appendix C. It is not difficult to validate that the assump-
tion in Theorem 3–(iii) holds for all the well-known GEV models in the literatures. For examples, for
the MNL, Yi∂Gi(Y) = Yi. For a nested logit mode specified by G(Y) =
∑
n∈N
(∑
i∈Cn σinY
µn
i
)1/µn
,
where N is the set of nests, Cn is the corresponding nest and µ,µn are some parameters, we
have Yi∂Gi(Y) = Y
µn
i
(∑
j∈Cn σjnY
µn
j
)1/µn−1
. If µn > 1 then Yi∂Gi(Y)≤ σ1/µn−1in Yi and if µn < 1
then Yi∂Gi(Y ) ≤ LnY µni , where Ln is an upper bound of
(∑
j∈Cn σjnY
µn
j
)1/µn−1
for all x ∈ Rmi ,
which always exists. For a more general GEV model, we note that ∂Gij(Y)≤ 0 and Yj ≥ 0 for all
i, j ∈ V, i 6= j. As a result, we have ∂Gi(Y)≤ ∂Gi(Y˜
i
), where Y˜
i
is a vector of size m with entries
Y˜ ii = Yi and Y˜
i
j = 0 for all j 6= i. Thus,∂Gi(Y˜
i
) is a function of only Yi. For a more complicated
GEV model such as the network GEV model (Daly and Bierlaire 2006), we can easily upper-bound
Yi∂Gi(Y˜
i
) by a function of form LiY
li
i , where Li, li > 0.
In Theorem 3, the first result (i) indicates that the penalty term
∑T
t=1 max{0, (αt)Tp− rt} is
monotonically decreasing as a function of λ. As a result, this term will converges to a non-negative
constant when λ increases. The second statement (ii) tells us explicitly that the penalty term will
converge to zero when the parameters λ are large enough. It also provides an estimate for mint{λt}
to get arbitrarily small penalty costs. The third result (iii) provides an upper-bound for the gap
between the optimal expected revenues given by the constrained pricing problem and the pricing
problem with over-expected-sale penalties, and this upper bound converges to zero linearly when
 goes to zero. So in general, Problem 17 can be viewed as a generalized version of the constrained
pricing problem in (28), in the sense that if we select the penalty parameters λ large enough, then
we will get a solution that is similar to the one from the constrained problem, and if we set λ = 0
then we come back to the unconstrained problem. Thus, the formulation in (18) provides a more
flexible way to handle expected sale requirements.
Theorem 3 also allows us to answer the question whether an optimal solution to (17) has the
constant-markup style. In general, we can show that a solution to (17) does not have a constant
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markup over products if the PSP are all homogeneous, or has a constant markup in each partition
if the PSP are partition-wise homogeneous and the CPGF is partition-wise separable (Corollary
3, the proof is given in Appendix B). For this reason, the results presented in this section are not
a generalized version of those shown in Sections 3 and 3.2 when the penalty parameters λ equals
zero.
Corollary 3. A solution to the unconstrained pricing problem with penalties (17) does not have a
constant-markup style.
Since we consider the pricing problem with over-expected-sale penalties, we do not face the issue of
violating the expected sale constraints when the choice parameters vary in the uncertainty set.We
consider the robust version of (17) under (a,b) uncertainty
max
x∈Rm
min
(a,b)∈A
{
Φ(x,a,b)−
T∑
t=1
λtmax{0, (αt)Tp− rt}
}
(19)
The adversarial problem of (19) is still difficult to solve as the objective function is not convex on
A. Surprisingly, in Theorem 4 below, we show that if under the robust optimal prices, an optimal
solution to the adversary problem can be identified, then it allows us to convert the robust problem
into a deterministic pricing problem with expected-sale-penalties. To obtain this result, we need
to assume that the uncertainty set is rectangular and the reason is similar to the case of not-
homogeneous PSP in Section 3.2. To avoid overly complicated proofs, we will first provide results for
the MNL model, then we will show results for a general GEV model with additional assumptions in
the next proposition. Theorem 4 shows results for the pricing problem with over-expected-penalties
under the MNL model.
Theorem 4. (A tractable solution for MNL-based robust pricing with over-expected-
sale penalties and rectangular uncertainty sets). If the choice model is MNL and the uncer-
tainty set A is rectangular, i.e., A= {(a,b)| (a,b) (a,b) (a, b)}, then the robust problem (19)
is equivalent to
v∗ = max
x
{
Φ(x,a,b)−
T∑
t=1
λtmax{0, (αt)Tp(x,a,b)− rt}
}
,
and the maximization problem can be formulated as a convex optimization one.
For notational convenience, let
L(x,a,b) = Φ(x,a,b)−
T∑
t=1
λtmax{0, (αt)Tp− rt}, and f(x) = max
x∈Rm
L(x,a,b).
We will also use the set A{(a,b)| ai ∈ {ai, ai}, bi ∈ {bi, bi}}, which is already defined in the proof
of Lemma 8. In general, the robust problem in (19) is challenging to handle because of the term
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t=1 λtmax{0, (αt)Tp−rt}, which makes the objective function no-longer differentiable in x. How-
ever, the good thing here is that if we consider the subset T ∈ [T ] such that the constraints are
violated only in T , we can write the objective function as
L(x,a,b) = Φ(x,a,b)−
∑
t∈T
λt(α
t)Tp+
∑
t∈T
λtrt
=
∑
i∈V
(xi−
∑
t∈T
λtα
t
i− ci)pi(x,a,b) +
∑
t∈T
λtrt (20)
and note that
∑
i∈V(xi−
∑
t∈T λtα
t
i − ci)pi(x,a,b) is also the expected revenue with shifted item
costs
∑
t∈T λtα
t
i + ci, ∀i∈ V. We will leverage this observation to prove the theorem.
In Lemma 9 below, we show that given any prices x ∈Rm, one of the solutions in the set A is
optimal to the adversary’s problem. This result is similar to the unconstrained case with partition-
wise PSP considered in Section 3.2.
Lemma 9. Given any x ∈ Rm, there is at least one solution (a,b) ∈ A that is optimal to the
corresponding adversary’s problem of (19).
Proof: Given x ∈ Rm, let (ax,bx) be optimal to the adversary problem. We also denote by T a
subset of [T ] such that (αt)Tp(x,ax,bx)≥ rt for all t ∈ T and (αt)Tp(x,ax,bx)< rt if t /∈ T . The
robust optimal value at x becomes
f(x) =
∑
i
(xi− ci)pi(x,ax,bx)−
∑
t∈T
λt(α
t)Tp(x,ax,bx) +
∑
t∈T
λtrt
=
∑
i
(
xi− ci−
∑
t∈T λtα
t
i
)
Y xi
1 +
∑
i Y
x
i
+
∑
t∈T
λtrt,
where Y xi = exp(a
x
i − bxi xi). For notational brevity, let
ρx =
∑
i
(
xi− ci−
∑
t∈T λtα
t
i
)
Y xi
1 +
∑
i Y
x
i
I1 = {i∈ V| ρx <xi− ci−
∑
t∈T
λtα
t
i}
I2 = {i∈ V| ρx >xi− ci−
∑
t∈T
λtα
t
i}
Ax = {(a,b)∈A| (ai, bi) = (ai, bi) if i∈ I1, (ai, bi) = (ai, bi) if i∈ I2}
From Lemma 5, if (ax,bx) /∈Ax then for any (a,b)∈Ax we have
f(x)>
∑
i
(xi− ci)pi(x,a,b)−
∑
t∈T
λt(α
t)Tp(x,a,b) +
∑
t∈T
λtrt
≥Φ(x,a,b)−
T∑
t=1
λtmax{0, (αt)Tp(x,a,b)− rt},
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which is contradictory to the assumption that (ax,bx) is optimal to the adversary’s problem. So
we have (ax,bx)∈Ax. On the other hand, Lemma 5 tells us that if we take any point (a,b)∈Ax
such that (a,b)∈A we also have
f(x) =
∑
i
(
xi− ci−
∑
t∈T
λtα
t
i
)
pi(x,a,b) +
∑
t∈T
λtrt
≥
∑
i
(xi− ci)pi(x,a,b)−
T∑
t=1
λtmax{0, (αt)Tp(x,a,b)− rt}=L(x,a,b).
Since f(x) = min(a,b)∈AL(x,a,b), we have f(x) =L(x,a,b), meaning that (a,b) is also optimal to
the adversary’s problem under prices x. This completes the proof. 
The lemma above tells us that a solution in which each coordinate is at a bound of the uncertainty
set is optimal to the adversary’s problem, given any prices. This allows us to reduce the searching
of the space for the adversary’s problem from an infinite to a finite set, which is helpful. The
number of elements in A is still huge (22m). The next lemma characterizes an important property
of the robust optimal prices, which allows us to further reduce the adversary’s searching space into
a singleton set, which greatly simplifies the robust problem. Let x∗ be a robust optimal solution
to the robust problem and (a∗,b∗) be an optimal solution to the adversary problem such that
(a∗,b∗) ∈ A, i.e., (a∗,b∗) are at the bounds of the the uncertainty set. We also denote by T ∗ a
subset of [T ] such that (αt)Tp(x∗,a∗,b∗) ≥ rt for all t ∈ T ∗ and (αt)Tp(x∗,a∗,b∗) < rt if t /∈ T ∗,
and let
ρ∗ =
∑
i
(
x∗i − ci−
∑
t∈T ∗ λtα
t
i
)
Y ∗i
1 +
∑
i Y
∗
i
, where Y ∗i = exp(a
∗
i − b∗ix∗i ).
Lemma 10. ρ∗ <x∗i − ci−
∑
t∈T ∗ λtα
t
i, for all i∈ V.
Proof: By contradiction, assume that there exits k ∈ V such that ρ∗ ≥ x∗k− ck−
∑
t∈T ∗ λtα
t
k. Let
δ= min
(a,b)∈A
{
L(x∗,a,b)−L(x∗,a∗,b∗)
∣∣∣ L(x∗,a,b)>L(x∗,a∗,b∗)} , (21)
with a note that we set δ = +∞ if the corresponding searching set is empty. Using Lemma 9 we
can choose (a∗,b∗) such that (a∗k, b
∗
k) = (ak, bk). So, if we select  > 0 such that  < (ak−ak)/bk then
a∗k− bk ≥ ak, meaning that (a∗− b∗kek,b∗)∈A and we have the following claim
L(x∗,a∗,b∗)≤L(x∗,a∗− b∗kek,b∗)
= (x∗i − ci)pi(x∗,a∗− b∗kek,b∗)−
T∑
t=1
λtmax{0, (αt)Tp(x∗,a∗− b∗kek,b∗)− rt}
= (x∗i − ci)pi(x∗+ ek,a∗,b∗)−
T∑
t=1
λtmax{0, (αt)Tp(x∗+ ek,a∗,b∗)− rt}
<L(x∗+ ek,a∗,b∗).
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Moreover, combining with the fact that L(x,a∗,b∗) and f(x) are continuous in x, we always can
select  > 0 small enough such that
L(x,a∗,b∗)<L(x+ ek,a∗,b∗) (22)
|f(x∗)− f(x∗+ ek)|< δ/2 (23)∣∣∣L(x∗+ ek,a,b)−L(x∗,a,b)∣∣∣< δ/2, (24)
where (a,b) is an optimal solution to the adversary’s problem under prices x+ ek. Using (23)
and (24) we have
|f(x∗)−L(x∗,a,b)| ≤ |f(x∗)− f(x∗+ ek)|+ |f(x∗+ ek)−L(x∗,a,b)|< δ.
So, according to the definition of δ in (21), we have f(x∗) =L(x∗,a,b), which means that (a,b)
is also an optimal solution to the adversary’s problem under prices x∗. So, we always can choose
an optimal solution (a∗,b∗) in the set of optimal solutions of the adversary’s problem under x∗
such that (a∗,b∗) = (a,b). Together with (22), we have
f(x∗) =L(x∗,a∗,b∗)<L(x∗+ ek,a∗,b∗) = f(x∗+ ek),
which is contradictory to our initial assumption that x∗ is a robust optimal solution. So our
contradiction hypothesis is untrue and this completes the proof. 
We are now ready for the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. From Lemma 9 and 10, we have that if x∗ is a robust optimal solution, then
(a,b) is the unique optimal solution to the adversary’s problem under robust optimal prices x∗.
We need to prove that x∗ is also optimal to the maximization problem maxxL(x,a,b). In this case,
the function L(x,a,b) is not differentiable in x, so we cannot use the techniques in the proof of
Lemma 8. Fortunately, if we consider the objective function L(x,a,b) as a function of the purchase
probabilities p, then it is strictly concave in p. To facilitate this point, lets us define
F(p,a,b) =L(x,a,b) = (x(p|a,b)− c)Tp−
T∑
t=1
λtmax{0, (αt)Tp− rt}
We know that the first term (x(p|a,b)− c)Tp is strictly concave in p (Zhang et al. 2018) and it
is not difficult to show that −∑Tt=1 λtmax{0, (αt)Tp− rt} is concave in p. As a result, F(p,a,b)
is strictly concave in p. Now, let p∗ be the purchase probabilities given by prices x∗ and choice
parameters (a,b). We will prove that p∗ = argmaxpK(p,a,b). By contradiction, assume that p˜=
argmaxpK(p,a,b) and K(p˜,a,b)>K(p∗,a,b). Since K(p,a,b) is strictly concave in p, we have,
for any t∈ (0,1),
tK(p˜,a,b) + (1− t)K(p∗,a,b)<K(tp˜+ (1− t)p∗,a,b)
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Since K(p˜,a,b) ≥ K(tp˜+ (1− t)p∗,a,b), we have K(p∗,a,b) < K(tp˜+ (1− t)p∗,a,b) for all t ∈
(0,1). This also mean that for any  > 0, we always can find a point p> 0,
∑
i pi < 1, such that
||p∗−p|| ≤  and K(p∗,a,b)<K(p,a,b). Since p(x,a,b) is continuous in x, this also means that
given any  > 0, there always exists x∈Rm such that ||x−x∗|| ≤  and L(x∗,a,b)<L(x,a,b).
Now, similarly to the proof of Lemma 8, let
τ = min
(a,b)∈A
{
L(x∗,a,b)−L(x∗,a,b)
∣∣∣ L(x∗,a,b)>L(x∗,a,b)} (25)
Since f(x) and L(x,a,b) are continuous in z, there is an  > 0 such that, for all x∈Rm, ||x∗−x|| ≤ {
|f(x∗)− f(x)|< τ/2
|L(x∗,ax,bx)−L(x,ax,bx)|< τ/2, (26)
where (ax,bx) is an optimal solution to the adversary’s problem (19) under prices x. As a result,
for all x such that ||x∗−x|| ≤ 
|L(x∗,a,b)−L(x∗,ax,bx)|< τ.
Combine this with (25) we have, for all x such that ||x∗ − x|| ≤ , (ax,bx) is optimal to the
adversary’s problem under prices x∗. Since (a,b) is the unique solution to the adversary’s problem
under prices x∗, we have (ax,bx) = (a,b). Moreover, we have shown that given any  > 0, there
exists x such that ||x−x∗|| ≤  and L(x,a,b)> L(x∗,a,b). If we choose  small enough, (a,b) is
also optimal to the adversary’s problem under x, which leads to f(x)> f(x∗). This is contradictory
to the fact that x∗ is a robust optimal solution. So, our contradiction hypothesis that p∗ is not
optimal to maxpK(p,a,b) is untrue, meaning that p∗ is optimal to maxpK(p,a,b), or equivalently,
x∗ is optimal to maxxL(x,a,b). We obtain the desired results. 
It is important to note that (a,b) is not necessary an adversary’s optimal solution under any
price vector x. To illustrate this observation, we simply select λ = 0 and a price vector x in such
a way that there is i ∈ V such that xi = ci. So, we have f(x) > xi − ci. Lemma 5 tells us that if
(ax,bx) is optimal to the adversary’s problem under prices x, then (ai, bi) = (ai, bi), meaning that
(a,b) is not optimal to the adversary’s problem. So, basically, to solve the adversary’s problem
under any price solution, one might need to go through all possible solutions in A or use a nonlinear
optimization solver, which is not computationally tractable.
An interesting question here is how the robust optimal value and optimal solution change when
the penalty parameters λ increase. To answer this, let ϕλ be the optimal value of the robust
problem in (19) under penalty parameters λ, ϕ be the optimal value of the constrained problem
with parameters (a,b), xλ is an robust solution to (19) and pλ is the purchase probabilities given
by the robust solution xλ in the worst-case. The following corollary is a direct result from Theorem
3 and 4, noting that in the case of the MNL model, Li, li (defined in Theorem 3) are equal to 1 for
all i∈ V.
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Corollary 4. (Convergence of the robust optimal values when the penalty parame-
ters λ increase). Assume that choice model is MNL and the uncertainty set is rectangular (A=
{(a,b)| (a,b) (a,b) (a, b)}). Given any  > 0, if we select λ such that mint λt ≥ (∆∗−ϕ)/ then∑
tmax{0, (αt)Tpλ − rt} ≤ , where ∆∗ = maxx Φ(x,a,b). Moreover, if we select  such that
≤min
t,i
{αti| αti > 0}min
t
{
rt
(αt)T1
}
,
then ϕλ −ϕ can be bounded as
0≤ϕλ −ϕ≤max
{
max
i
{
ai
bi
− 1
bi
log δ()
}
,0
}
m
mint,i{αti| αti > 0}
,
where δ() is defined as in Theorem 3.
We can also extend the results of Theorem 4 for robust pricing problems under GEV models, under
the assumption that the CPGF is partition-wise separable and we require that the expected sale
parameters are the same in each partition. Since the robust prices in this context would not have
the constant-markup style (Corollary 3) , i.e., robust optimal prices would not have a constant
markup in each partition. The techniques used in Section 3.2 cannot be used and we are unable to
identify robust solutions in this context. However, it we only seek constant-markup solutions, i.e.,
x∈X := {x∈Rm+ | xi− ci = xj − cj, ∀i, j ∈ Vn, n∈ [N ]}, then the robust problem can be converted
into a convex optimization problem (Proposition 6). We refer the reader to Section 3.2 for the
definitions of Gn(·), Yn, ∀n∈ [N ].
Proposition 6. (Robust solutions for the robust pricing problem under GEV mod-
els with over-expected-sale penalties). Assume that the uncertainty set is rectangular (A=
{(a,b)| (a,b) (a,b) (a, b)}) and the CPGF G(Y) is partition-wise separable as defined in Sec-
tion 3.2 and αti = α
t
j for all i, j ∈ Vn, n∈ [N ]. If z∗ is optimal to the problem
max
z∈RN
{
H(z,a,b)) =
∑
n∈[N ] znG
n(Yn|zn,a,b)
1 +
∑
n∈[N ]G
n(Yn|zn,a,b)
−
T∑
t=1
λtmax{0, (dt)TpG− rt}
}
, (27)
where dt is a vector of size N with entries dtn = α
t
i for all i ∈ Vn, n ∈ [N ], t ∈ [T ] and pG is of
size N with entries pGn = G
n(Yn|zn,a,b)
/(
1 +
∑
j∈[N ]G
j(Yj|zj,a,b)
)
, then x∗ ∈ Rm such that
x∗i = ci+z
∗
n, ∀n∈ [n], i∈ Vn is optimal to the robust problem maxx∈X min(a,b)∈AL(x,a,b). Moreover,
(27) can be reformulated as a convex optimization problem.
We provide the proof of Proposition 6 in Appendix D. This proof is done in a similar way as in the
proof of Theorem 4, where we try to show that under the robust optimal prices, (a,b) is a unique
solution to the adversary’s problem. To show that the equivalent optimization problem (40) is
convex, we convert the problem into an MNL-based problem with heterogeneous PSP, and results
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from previous studies (Zhang et al. 2018) can be used. The limitation of the Proposition 6 is that
it only returns best solutions among those that have a constant markup in each partition, and all
the expected sale penalties in each partition need to be the same. Relaxing these assumption would
make the robust problem challenging to handle (see the discussion after Corollary 3). Moreover,
we believe that Proposition 6 is still useful in some contexts, where the firm only wants to make
pricing decisions for each group of products and only impose expected sale requirements for the
whole groups instead of each single product in the groups.
5. Numerical experiments
In this section we provide experimental results to show how the robust models considered in
Sections 3 (i.e, robust unconstrained pricing with homogeneous or partition-wise homogeneous
PSP) and 4 (i.e., robust pricing with over-expected-sale penalties) protect us from choice parameter
uncertainties.
When the choice parameters are not given exactly, one can consider a deterministic approach
where the mean values of the choice parameters are employed. In this context, we know that the
pricing problem is computationally tractable (Zhang et al. 2018). Alternatively, one may look at
different possibilities of the choice parameters and define a mixed version where the market is
divided into a finite number of market segments and each segment is governed by a scenario of the
choice parameters. However, one can show that the expected revenue in this context is no longer
unimodal and the constant-markup property identified for the GEV pricing problem no-longer
holds, even if there are only two market segments (Li et al. 2018). As a result, this mixed version
is not computationally tractable.
Another baseline approach that can be used to account for parameters uncertainty is to sample
some choice parameters from the uncertainty set and use simulation to select a solution that pro-
vides best protection from worst-case scenarios. More precisely, let assume that the firm needs to
make a pricing decision while being aware that the choice parameters may vary in an uncertainty
set. In this context, the firm can sample some points from the uncertainty set and compute the
corresponding optimal prices for each selection, using the deterministic approach from Zhang et al.
(2018). Then, for each price vector, the firm can sample a sufficiently large number of vector of
choice parameters from the uncertainty set, in order to evaluate how each price vector obtained per-
forms when the choice parameters vary in the uncertainty set. This can be done by simply selecting
the solution that gives the best worst-case profit among the samples. This approach may be compu-
tationally tractable with a reasonable number of samples, but would be much more computationally
expensive than the robust and deterministic approaches. We refer to this as the sampling-based
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pricing approach. One can show that solutions given by the sampling-based approach will converge
to those from the robust counterpart when the sample sizes grow to infinity.
In these experiments, we will compare our robust models, which are computationally tractable,
against the sampling-based approach and the deterministic counterparts with mean-value choice
parameters. In the sampling-based approach, we sample points uniformly from the uncertainty set
since we do not make any assumption about the distribution of the choice parameters. One can
argue that the uniform distribution may not be the best choice in the case that the firm believes
that it has some ideas (perhaps via estimation) about the distribution of the choice parameters.
Nevertheless, estimating such a distribution is not easy in practice. A common approach in choice
modeling is to assume that the parameters follow some distributions (e.g. normal distribution)
with unknown coefficients and try to estimate these coefficients by maximum likelihood estimation
(McFadden and Train 2000). This approach, even though popular, does not guarantee that the
distribution obtained is the true distribution of the choice parameters, assuming that there exists
a true distribution. As such, the distribution of the choice parameters is typically only known
ambiguously. Distributionally robust optimization is a robust approach that is explicitly designed
to handle this ambiguity (Shapiro 2018), which we keep for future research.
A crucial decision for our robust models and the sampling-based approach is to define the uncer-
tainty set. A common approach in the robust optimization literature is to describe an uncertainty
set as an ellipsoidal set
A=
{
(a,b)
∣∣∣ ||(a,b)− (a0,b0)|| ≤ } ,
where || · || is an appropriate norm, (a0,b0) is the center of the ellipsoid and can be interpreted as the
most likely parameter vector associated with the underlying deterministic counterparts, and ∈R+
reflects an “uncertainty level” of the uncertainty set. Larger  values provide larger uncertainty
sets, corresponding to more conservative models that may help protect well against worst-case
scenarios, but may lead to low average performance. On the other hand, smaller  values provide
smaller uncertainty sets and would lead to less conservative robust solutions, which may perform
well in terms of average performance but would be less beneficial in protecting bad scenarios of
the choice parameters. We will show these in detail in the following sections.
An uncertainty set can be constructed by considering different possibilities of the choice param-
eter estimates. For example, there may be a setting where the firm operates in a market with Q
heterogeneous customer types, each corresponding to a vector of choice parameter (aq,bq), q ∈Q,
and the firm is uncertain about the proportion of each customer type. This suggests an idea to
construct an ellipsoidal uncertainty set as A =
{
(a,b)
∣∣∣ ||(a,b)− (a0,b0)|| ≤ } where (a0,b0) =
1/Q
∑
q∈[Q](aq,bq) and  is chosen as the minimum possible value such that (aq,bq) ∈ A for all
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q ∈ [Q]. In our context, we choose the L-1 norm for the case of the unconstrained robust prob-
lem with homogeneous PSP, as it allows to linearize the constraints of the adversary’s problem.
In the other cases (unconstrained pricing with partition-wise homogeneous PSP or pricing with
over-expected-sale penalties), since our results require rectangular uncertainty sets, we choose the
L-infinity norm.
5.1. Unconstrained Pricing with Homogeneous PSP
In this section we work with the robust unconstrained pricing problems with homogeneous PSP
considered in Section 3.1. The goal here is to compare the robust (RO) approach against the
standard deterministic (DET) and the sampling-based (SA) approaches under two popular GEV
models in the literature, i.e., the MNL and nested logit models, when the PSP are the same over
all the products. In this context, we know that the optimal prices for all the cases (RO, DET, and
SA) have a constant markup with respect to the product costs, and this constant markup can be
computed by a closed-form formula for the DET and SA approaches and by binary search for the
RO approach.
We choose m= 50 and manually choose a vector of item costs c where ci ∈ [10,30], ∀i ∈ V, and
the mean choice parameters (a0, b0) where a0,i ∈ [7,23], ∀i ∈ V, and b0 = 0.535, noting that in this
experiment, there is only one price sensitive parameter for all the products. Given an uncertainty
level  > 0, we define the polyhedron uncertainty A= {(a, b)| ||a−a0||1+β||b−b0||1 ≤ }, where ||.||1
stands for the L1 norm and β is the scale of the PSP b with respect to a. The comparison is done
as follows. For each , we solve the corresponding robust problem and obtain a robust solution xRO.
For the DET, we solve the deterministic model with the mean-value parameters (a0,b0) and obtain
an optimal solution xDET. For the SA approach, we sample randomly and uniformly n1 points
from the uncertainty set, and for each point compute the corresponding optimal prices, which
have a constant markup over products. For each pricing solution, we again sample randomly and
uniformly n2 = 1000 choice parameters from A, and compute and pick a pricing solution with the
largest worst-case expected revenue among the 1000 samples. We test this approach with n1 = 10
and n1 = 50 and denote the corresponding solutions as x
SA10, xSA50, respectively. Larger n1 can be
chosen, but it would mean that the SA becomes way more expensive as compared to the RO and
DET approaches. For example, if we choose n1 = 100, the SA requires to solve 100 deterministic
problems and compute 105 expected revenues to obtain a pricing solution.
To evaluate the performance of the three approaches when the choice parameters vary, given
the uncertainty set defined above, we randomly and uniformly sample 1000 parameters (a,b) from
the set A, and compute the expected revenues given by xRO, xSA10, xSA50, and xDET. So, for each
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Figure 1 Comparison between revenue distributions given by two optimal price vectors given by the robust (RO)
and deterministic (DET) approaches, under the MNL choice model and different uncertainty level .
solution, we get a distribution of expected revenues over 1000 samples, and we draw the histograms
of the distributions obtained in Figure 1 for ∈ {0.5,1.0,1.5}.
When = 0.5, the distributions given by the RO and SA50 are similar, but with larger  we see
that the distributions given by the RO approach have higher peaks, lower variances and shorter
tails, as compared to the other approaches. In addition, the sampling-based approach (SA10 and
SA50) perform better then the DET in terms of protecting us against too low revenues. In this
aspect, the the SA50 also performs better than the SA10, especially when  is large.
In Table 1 in Appendix E, we provide more details about the maximum, average and worst-case
values of the distributions given by the three approach. In particular, we compute the “percentile
ranks” of the RO worst-case revenues, which indicates the percentages that the expected revenues
given by the baseline approaches (DET, SA10 and SA50) are lower than the corresponding worst-
case expected revenues given by the RO. For example, for = 1.5, there are 19% of the revenues
given by the DET (over 1000 sampled revenues) are less than the corresponding RO worst-case
revenue (i.e. 19.8). Over ∈ {0.5, . . . ,10}, the average percentile ranks of the RO worst-case revenues
are 34%, 27.3% and 26.1% for the DET, SA10 and SA50 approaches, respectively, which clearly
indicates gains from the use of the RO approach, especially when the uncertainty is high.
We also provide experimental results for the robust model under the nested logit model, which
was done under the same settings as for the MNL case, i.e., there are 50 items with the same mean-
value choice parameters (a0,b0) and the same item costs c. The CPGF of the nested logit model is
given as G(Y) =
∑
n∈[N ]
(∑
i∈Cn Y
µn
i
)µ/µn
, where [N ] is the set of nests and for each n∈ [N ], Cn is
the corresponding subset of the items, µ and µn, n ∈N are the positive parameters of the nested
logit model. In this experiment, we separate the whole item set into 5 nests of the same size (10
items per each nest), i.e. N = 5 and |Cn|= 10 for all n ∈ [N ]. Moreover, we select µ= 1 and µn,
n ∈N are 0.88, 0.61, 0.92, 0.95 and 1.0, respectively. The corresponding distributions are plotted
in Figure 2, which are quite similar to the case of the MNL model. We further refer the reader
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to Table 2 in Appendix E for more details about the average, maximum, worst-case revenues and
percentile ranks when  increases, for which a similar observation as in the case of the MNL model
applies. It is interesting to note that the average percentile ranks in this case are remarkably higher
than those from the MNL case, meaning that the RO approach does a better job when the choice
model is the nested logit. In general, we also see the advantages of the RO approach in protecting
us from “bad” scenarios of the parameters (a,b).
Figure 2 Comparison between revenue distributions given by two optimal price vectors given by the robust (RO)
and deterministic (DET) approaches, under the nested logit model and different uncertainty level .
To further illustrate the protection of the RO approach in the worst-case scenarios, in Figure 3
we plot the worst-case revenues given by xRO, xSA10, xSA50 and xDET when  varies from 0 to 10.
The worst-case revenues given by the DET and SA solutions decrease fast when  increases and
become close to zero when  ≥ 5. On the other hand, the worst-case revenues given by the RO
approach are still significant even with highest values of  considered (= 10). It is also interesting
to see the the curves given by the MNL is more smooth than those from the nested logit model.
Figure 3 Worst-case expected revenues as functions of 
In summary, the baseline approaches (DET, SA10, SA50) always give higher average and maxi-
mum revenues, but lower worst-case revenues, which clearly indicates that the RO approach does a
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better job in protecting us from worst-case situations, but also show the trade-off of being robust.
Moreover, the results in Tables 1 and 2 also tell us that if the firm cares more about the worst
cases, a large  can be chosen to have better protection against too low expected revenues. On the
other hand, if average performance is of concern, then by choosing a small , one can still get a
protection from the robust solutions, but also get an average performance that is comparable to
that of the solutions by the deterministic approach. This observation is also consistent with other
robust approaches in the revenue management literature (Li and Ke 2019, Rusmevichientong and
Topaloglu 2012).
5.2. Unconstrained Pricing with Partition-wise Homogeneous PSP
In this section we provide comparison results for the case of partition-wise homogeneous PSP
considered in Section 3.2. We use the nested logit model specified above but the PSP are the same
in each nest but different across nests. Note that in this case, we only provide results for the robust
model with rectangular uncertainty sets. In this context, we know that the robust problem can
be converted equivalently into the deterministic problem with parameters (a,b). So basically, the
RO and DET approaches can be done by solving two deterministic problems, one with the choice
parameters (a,b) and one with the mean-value parameters (a0,b0). On the other hand, for the SA
approach, if we select n1 vectors of choice parameters from the uncertainty set, we need to solve
n1 deterministic problems.
For each uncertainty level  > 0, we define an rectangular uncertainty set A = {(a,b)| a ∈
[a0− 1,a0 + 1]; b∈ [b0− 1/β,b0 + 1/β]}, where 1 is a unit vector of appropriate size. Vector a0
is chosen similarly as in the previous section and b0 is chosen as (0.535,0.635,0.335,0.735,0.454).
The latter selection is due to that fact that the nested logit model has 5 nests and the PSP are
the same in each nest. Here, to simplify the experiments, we only consider uncertainty sets where
the differences between the bounds and the mean values are the same over all the coordinates.
Similarly to the previous section, we first solve the deterministic problem with the mean-value
parameters (a0,b0) to obtain a solution x
DET. Then, for each set A we solve the RO problem to
obtain a robust solution xRO (i.e., solve the deterministic pricing problem with choice parameters
(a0− 1,b0 + 1/β)). We also sample n1 = 10 and n1 = 50 points from A for the the SA approach.
To evaluate the performance of the solutions obtained, we also sample 1000 points randomly and
uniformly from A and compute the expected revenues given by xRO, xSA10, xSA50, and xDET. The
distributions of the expected revenue over 1000 samples with ∈ {0.5,1.0,1.5} are plotted in Figure
4. There is nothing surprising, as similarly to the previous experiments, distributions given by xRO
have small variances, higher peaks, shorter tails and higher worst-case revenues, as compared to
those from xSA10, xSA50 and xDET. We also refer the reader to Table 3 in Appendix E for more
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details about the average, maximum and worst-case revenues when  increases from 0.2 to 4.0. We
also see that the RO approach always gives higher worst-case revenues but lower average revenues,
and the SA approaches also provide some protections against low revenues. However, in this case,
even-though the percentile ranks for the DET approach are still high (30.6 on average), those from
the SA50 are significantly lower (5.6 on average). In particular, we see that there are some instances
where the percentile ranks are only 3-th, which means that only 3% of the revenues are lower than
the corresponding RO worst-case revenues. Nevertheless , the average revenues given by the SA50
are remarkably higher than those from the RO, especially when  is large. As such, the RO seems
too conservative in this case (partially homogeneous PSP with rectangular uncertainty sets), and
large  should not be chosen.
Figure 4 Distributions of the expected revenues under over-expected-sale penalties given by xRO and xDET under
a nested logit model with partition-wise homogeneous PSP.
5.3. Pricing with Over-expected-sale Penalties
We first provide experiments to show how the constrained pricing model performs when the choice
parameters are uncertain, and how the deterministic pricing model with over-expected-sale penal-
ties works, as compared to the constrained counterpart. We take the nested logit model with
homogeneous PSP considered above. We create one expected sale constraint (i.e., T = 1) in such
a way that the optimal prices from the unconstrained problem do not satisfy the expected sale
constraint.
In the first experiment, our goal is to show how the constrained pricing model (28) performs
when the choice parameters are uncertain. To this end, we solve the deterministic problem with
the mean-value parameters (a0,b0) to obtain a solution x
DET. Then, we select an uncertainty
level  > 0 and assume that the choice parameters vary in the uncertainty set A = {(a,b)| a ∈
[a0− 1,a0 + 1]; b∈ [b0− 1/β,b0 + 1/β]}. We then randomly (and uniformly) sample a∈ [a0−
1,a0 + 1] and b∈ [b0− 1/β,b0 + 1/β]. For each sample, we compute the corresponding vector
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of purchase probabilities and check whether that vector satisfies the expected sale constraints. We
also compute the penalty costs as percents of the thresholds rt, which can explain how the new
purchase probabilities violate the constraints. These percentages based on 1000 samples are plotted
in the left sub-figure of Figure 5. We see that there are about 50% of the samples for which the
purchase probabilities given by xDET violate the expected sale constraints. On the other hand, the
penalty costs increase significantly when  increases.
Figure 5 Left figure: Percentages of times that the purchase probabilities given by xDET violate the expected
sale constraints, and penalty costs as percents of rt when  varies. Right figure: The expected revenue
values and penalty costs given by (18) when λt vary.
To illustrate the convergence of the optimal values of the pricing problem with over-expected-
sale penalties when the penalty parameters λ increase, in Figure 5 we plot vλ, the optimal value of
the constrained pricing problem v∗, and the penalty costs max{0, (α1)Tp− r1} as functions of λ1,
noting that in this experiment T = 1. We see that when λ1 ≥ 0.6, the objective values vλ become
very close to the optimal value of the constrained pricing problem, and the penalty cost is also
close to zero. This observation is indeed in line with the claims established in Theorem 3.
Now, we move to the robust version of the pricing problem under choice parameter uncertainty.
We select m= 50 and consider a MNL-based pricing problem with one expected sale constraint.
The expected sale constraint and the mean-value parameters (a0) are the same as in the previous
experiments and the parameters b0 are chosen similarly as in the case of pricing under the nested
logit model with partition-wise homogeneous PSP. For each uncertainty level  > 0, we define the
rectangular uncertainty set A = {(a,b)| a∈ [a0− 1,a0 + 1]; b∈ [b0− 1/β,b0 + 1/β]}.
Our goal here is to illustrate how the robust model with over-expected-sale penalties performs,
as compared to other baseline approaches, i.e., deterministic and sampling-based counterparts and
the deterministic constrained pricing problem. To this end, we solve the deterministic constrained
pricing problem with the mean-value parameters (a0,b0) to obtain a solution x
DET-CON, solve the
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deterministic pricing problem under over-expected-sale penalties with the mean-value parameters
(a0,b0) to obtain a solution x
DET-PEN. For the SA approach, we only sample n1 = 10 points from
the uncertainty set, due to the fact that the number of points n1 is also the number of convex
optimization problems to be solved, and these optimization problems, even-though computationally
tractable, are much more expensive to solve, as compared to closed-form solutions for the case of
unconstrained pricing considered in Section 3.1. As such, for each , we sample 10 points from
A and use simulation of 1000 samples to select a solution xSA10. For the RO approach, we solve
the robust problem (19) with the uncertainty set A to obtain a robust solution xRO. Theorem 4
tells use that for the DET-PEN, RO and DET-CON approaches, we only need to solve one convex
optimization problem, while the SA10 requires to solve 10 convex nonlinear optimization problems.
To evaluate the performance of the solutions obtained, similarly to the previous sections, we
sample randomly and uniformly 1000 points from A and compute the corresponding expected
revenues given by the four solutions xDET-CON, xDET-PEN, xSA10 and xRO. The distributions of the
profit values (the expected revenue minus the penalty cost) over 1000 choice parameter samples for
different λ and  are plotted in Figure 6, where similar observations apply. The histograms given
by xRO have higher peaks, smaller variances, shorter tails and get tighter as  increases. When
λ= 0.2, the histograms given by xSA10 have higher peaks, smaller variances and better worst-case
values than those from xDET-CON, xDET-PEN. This seems however not the case for λ= 0.6, especially
when λ= 0.6 and = 1.5, the SA10 gives remarkably low profit values as compared to the other
approach. More detailed results are provided in Table 4 in Appendix E. In general, we also see that
the RO approach always gives higher worst-case but lower average profits. The SA10 also provides
some protections against worst-case scenarios, The DET-PEN and SA10 seems to have similar
performance, which may be due to the fact that the number of samples points n1 is small. The
percentile ranks of the RO worst-case profits are small for the DET-PEN and SA10 approaches, as
compared to those reported in previous experiments, which indicates the conservativeness of the
RO approach, especially when  is large.
We also observe that xDET-CON gives lower-value histogram when λ= 0.2 and similar histogram
when λ= 0.6, as compared to xDET-PEN, which is in line with the claims of Theorem 3 stating that
when λ increases, solution given by the pricing problem with over-expected-sale penalties converge
to solutions given by the constrained pricing problem. To further illustrate this, we fix = 0.5 and
increase λ from 0.1 to 0.4 and plot the corresponding histograms in Figure 7, which clearly shows
that xDET-CON always gives lower-value histograms, and these histograms become similar to those
given by xDET-PEN when λ increase.
In summary, our experiments for the three cases (robust unconstrained pricing with homogeneous
and partition-wise homogeneous PSP, and robust pricing with over-expected-sale penalties) show
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Figure 6 Distributions of the profit values under over-expected-sale penalties given by xRO, xSA10, xDET-PEN and
xDET-CON
Figure 7 Distributions of the profits given by xDET-PEN and xDET-CON when λ∈ {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4}.
gains from our robust models in protecting us from revenues that would be too low. The histograms
given by the robust models have higher peaks, smaller variances, higher worst-case revenues, but
lower averages, as compared to their deterministic counterparts. This observation also shows the
trade-off in being robust in making pricing decisions when the choice parameters are uncertain, and
also consistent with observations from other robust studies in the revenue management literature
(Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu 2012, Li and Ke 2019).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered robust versions of the pricing problem under GEV choice models,
in which the choice parameters are not given in advance but lie in an uncertainty set. These robust
models are motivated by the fact that uncertainties may occur in the estimation procedure of the
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choice parameters. We have shown that when the problem is unconstrained and the PSP are the
same over all the products, the robust optimal prices have a constant markup with respect to the
product costs and we have shown how to efficiently compute this constant markup by binary search.
When the PSP are partition-wise homogeneous and the CPGF are also partition-wise separable,
we have shown that if the uncertainty set is rectangular, we can convert the robust problem into an
equivalent deterministic pricing problem, in which the optimal prices can be computed by explicit
formulas.
We have also considered the pricing problem with over-expected-revenue-penalties as an alter-
native to the constrained pricing problem. We have shown that, when the penalty parameters goes
to infinity, the penalty term converges to zero and the optimal value converges to the expected
revenue given by the constrained pricing problem. Since there may be no fixed prices under which
the purchase probabilities always satisfy the expected sale constraints when the choice parameters
vary, the robust version of the pricing problem under over-expected-sale penalties is more appro-
priate to use in this context, as opposed to the robust constrained version. We have shown that
if the uncertainty set is rectangular and the choice model is MNL, the robust problem can be
converted equivalently into a deterministic one that can be solve efficiently by convex optimization.
This results can be extended to robust pricing problems under GEV models under some additional
assumptions on the expected sale parameters and the feasible set of the prices. Experimental results
based on the MNL and nested logit models have shown the advantages of our robust model in
providing protection against bad-case revenues. In future research, it would be interesting to look
at distributionally robust versions of the pricing problem, which may help provide less conserva-
tive robust solutions as compared to the standard robust optimization approaches. We are also
interested in robust approaches for the joint assortment and pricing problem under GEV choice
models.
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Appendix A: Robust Constrained Pricing
Motivated by the fact that the expected profit is concave in the purchase probabilities, previous
studies (Zhang et al. 2018, Keller 2013) show that it is convenient to consider the pricing problem
with expected sale constraints. Technically speaking, given a GEV-CPGF G(Y), price vector x ∈
Rm andparameters (a,b)∈R2m, let us define the vector of purchase probabilities of products p with
entries pi = Pi(x,a,b|G). We also let x(p|a,b,G) be the denote the prices that achieve the purchase
probabilities p. The deterministic version of the constrained pricing problem can be formulated as
max
p∈P
(∑
i∈V
x(p|a,b)i− ci
)
pi. (28)
where P ∈ Rm is a convex set such that for all p ∈ P, ∑i∈V pi ≤ 1. One the optimal purchase
probabilities p is specified, we can obtain the optimal prices x(p|a,b,G) by solving a convex opti-
mization problem. A natural robust version of the constrained pricing problem can be formulated
as
max
p∈P
{
φ(p) = min
(a,b)∈A
∑
i∈V
(x(p|a,b,G)i− ci)pi
}
. (29)
Even though it is not difficult to show (29) is computationally tractable under rectangular or some
polyhedrons uncertainty sets, the issue here is that the final decision is a price vector, not purchase
probabilities. So even if we get an optimal purchase probabilities p from the robust model, it is
not clear how to compute the corresponding optimal prices under (a,b) uncertainty. On the other
hand, one can show that given any prices x, there may be (a,b) ∈A such the resulting purchase
probability vector p= P (x,a,b|G) that does not belong to the feasible set (i.e. the expected sale
constraints are not satisfied). All these make the robust version in (29) inappropriate to use. This
is the reasonwe propose an alternative robust model in Section 4, in which instead of requiring
the purchasing probabilities to satisfy some constraints, we add a penalty cost to the objective
function.
Alternatively, in some situations the firm may face uncertainties occurring in the inventory,
leading to uncertain expected sale constraints. A robust model may require that the expected sales
constraints are satisfied for all the scenarios that may occur, i.e., p ∈ P(ξ), for all ξ ∈ Ξ. Such a
robust model can be formulated as
max
p
(∑
i∈V
x(p|a,b)i− ci
)
pi (30)
subject to (αt(ξ))Tp≤ rt(ξ) ∀ξ ∈Ξ∑
i∈V
pi ≤ 1, p≥ 0
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where (αt(ξ), rt(ξ)), ∀t, are the parameters of the expected sale constraints, which are not certain
in the context and depend on a random vector ξ ∈Ξ. Since the objective function is concave and all
the constraints are linear in p, the above problem is generally tractable (Ben-Tal and Nemirovski
1998). A simple but useful setting is that the parameter of the expected sale constraints vary in
a rectangular uncertainty set, i.e., αt αt αt and rt ≤ rt ≤ rt for all t ∈ [T ]. In this context, one
can show that (30) is equivalent to the following convex optimization problem
max
p
(∑
i∈V
x(p|a,b)i− ci
)
pi (31)
subject to (αt)Tp≤ rt∑
i∈V
pi ≤ 1, p≥ 0
Other uncertainty sets may be considered, i.e., polyhedron or ellipsoidal ones, and we refer the
reader to Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1998) for details.
Appendix B: Proof of Corollary 3
We will give a counter example to illustrate the claim. For the sake of illustration, we only consider
a pricing problem under the MNL model with 2 products and the PSP are homogeneous. We also
consider only one expected sale constraint as α1p1 ≤ rt, where rt/α1 is very small. Let pλ = (pλ1 , pλ2)
be a solution to (28) under penalty parameter λ. When λ goes to infinity, Theorem 3 tells us
that a solution to the pricing problem with penalties converge to a solution to the constrained
pricing problem. Thus, for any  > 0 arbitrarily small, we can chose λ large enough such that
α1p
λ
1 ≤ rt + . So, if we choose  and rt/α1 to be very small, then pλ1 would be very close to
zero. Since pλ1 = exp(a1− bxλ1)
/
(1 + exp(a1− bxλ1) + exp(a2− bxλ2)) (where b is the PSP of the two
products, xλ is an optimal price solution to the pricing problem under penalty parameter λ), we
have limpλ1→0 x
λ
1(p) = +∞, meaning that to have an arbitrarily small probability pλ1 , we need to
increase the price of Product 1 to infinity. On the other hand, pλ2 does not affect the penalty term
and we have limx2→+∞(x2 − c2) exp(a2 − bx2)
/
(1 + exp(a1− bxλ1) + exp(a2− bx2)) = 0. Thus, to
maximize the objective function, the solution xλ2 needs to be finite. So, in summary, we can create
an example yielding a solution (xλ1 , x
λ
2) such that x
λ
1 can be arbitrarily large and x
λ
2 is bounded from
above. Thus, (xλ1 , x
λ
2) would not have the constant-markup style. If the PSP not not homogeneous,
but partition-wise homogeneous, we just consider a model that has only one partition, and the
above example can be reused.
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Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 3
First, for notational simplicity we denote R(p) =
∑
i∈V (x(p|a,b,G)i− ci)pi. For (i), we have the
following inequalities
R(pλ
1
)−
∑
t
λ1t max{0, (αt)Tpλ
1 − rt} ≥R(pλ2)−
∑
t
λ1t max{0, (αt)Tpλ
2 − rt}
=R(pλ
2
)−
∑
t
λ2t max{0, (αt)Tpλ
2 − rt}− 
∑
t
max{0, (αt)Tpλ2 − rt}
≥R(pλ1)−
∑
t
λ2t max{0, (αt)Tpλ
1 − rt}− 
∑
t
max{0, (αt)Tpλ2 − rt}
So, we have

∑
t
max{0, (αt)Tpλ2 − rt} ≥
∑
t
(λ1t −λ2t )max{0, (αt)Tpλ
1 − rt},
which leads to the desired inequality.
For (ii), since (αt)Tp∗ ≤ rt for all t, given λ ∈RT+, we have
vλ ≥R(p∗)−
∑
t
λtmax{0, (αt)Tp∗− rt}=R(p∗) = v∗.
Moreover, since vλ − v∗ =R(pλ)− v∗−∑t λtmax{0, (αt)Tpλ − rt}, we have
R(pλ)− v∗ ≥
∑
t
λtmax{0, (αt)Tpλ − rt} ≥ λ0
∑
t
max{0, (αt)Tpλ − rt} (32)
The left hand side of (32) is less than ∆∗ − v∗, so if we choose λ0 ≥ (∆∗ − v∗)/ then∑
tmax{0, (αt)Tpλ − rt} ≤  as desired.
We move to (iii). As shown previously, we can choose λ0 such that max{0, (αt)Tpλ − rt} ≤  or
(αt)Tpλ ≤ rt +  for all t∈ [T ]. We now consider the following problem
max
p≥0∑
i pi≤1
{
R(p)
∣∣∣ (αt)Tp≤ rt + , ∀t} (33)
and denote by p as an optimal solution to (33). Since pλ is feasible to (33) we have R(p)≥R(pλ).
Moreover, if we define P := {p ∈Rm| pi ≥ 0,
∑
i pi ≤ 1, (αt)Tpλ ≤ rt,∀t ∈ [T ]}, then v∗ ≥R(p) for
all p∈P. Therefore, we have
|vλ − v∗| ≤R(p)−R(p), ∀p∈P. (34)
We will show that there is p ∈ P such that ||p − p|| can be arbitrarily small when  decreases,
which allows us to use the Mean Value Theorem to bound |R(p˜)−R(p)|. If p ∈P, then the result
is obvious and we have |vλ − v∗|. Now assume that p /∈P, let T := {t ∈ [T ]| (αt)Tp > rt} and for
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any t ∈ T we select it = argmaxi∈V{pi | αti > 0}. Then we denote I = {it| t ∈ T }. We pick a p˜ such
that {
p˜i = p

i − /(mint,j{αtj| αtj > 0}), ∀i∈ I
p˜j = p

j, ∀j /∈ I.
(35)
With this selection, we see that, for any t∈ T
(αt)Tp˜≤ (αt)Tp−αtit/(mint,i {α
t
i| αti > 0})
≤ (αt)Tp− ≤ rt.
(36)
And indeed for any t /∈ T we have (αt)Tp˜ ≤ (αt)Tp ≤ rt. Furthermore, for any t ∈ T , we have
(αt)Tp > rt. Combine this with the fact that it = argmaxi∈V{pi | αti > 0} we have(∑
i
αti
)
ptt ≥ (αt)Tp > rt.
So, under the assumption on the selection of , we have the chain of inequalities
pit >
rt
(αt)T1
≥min
t
{
rt
(αt)T1
}
≥ 
mint,i{αti| αti > 0}
,
meaning that p˜> 0. So, combine with (36) we have p˜∈P.
Moreover, for any point p′ ∈ [p˜,p] and any i∈ I, we have
p′i ≥ p˜i = pi −

mint,i{αti| αti > 0}
>min
t
{
rt
(αt)T1
}
− 
mint,i{αti| αti > 0}
:= δ(). (37)
So, if we denote x′ = x(p′,G) (i.e., the prices that result in purchase probabilities p′). For any
i∈ I, under the assumption that Yi∂Gi(Y)≤LiY lii we have
LiYi(x
′)li ≥ p′i(1 +G(Y(x′)))δ()
≥ p′i ≥ δ(),
where Y(x′) is a vector of size m with entries Yj(x′) = exp(aj − bjx′j), ∀j ∈ V. So we have
x′i ≤
ai
bi
− 1
bili
log
δ()
Li
.
Moreover, if we look at the gradient of R(p) at p′i. According to Theorem 4.3 in Zhang et al. (2018)
we have
∇pR(p′)i ≤ x′i ≤max
i
{
ai
bi
− 1
bili
log
δ()
Li
}
. (38)
Now, we look at |R(p)−R(p˜)| and by combining (35), (38), the Mean Value Theorem tells us
that there is p′ ∈ [p˜,p]
|R(p)−R(p˜)|=
∑
i∈I
∇pR(p′)i|p˜i− pi |
≤max
i
{
ai
bi
− 1
bili
log
δ()
Li
}
m
mint,i{αti| αti > 0}
(39)
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Combine (39) with (34) and recall that p˜∈P, we have
|vλ − v∗| ≤max
i
{
ai
bi
− 1
bili
log
δ()
Li
}
m
mint,i{αti| αti > 0}
.
Combine with the case p ∈P, we obtain the desired bound, which definitely converge to zero when
 tends to zero, as desired.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 6
For any price solution x ∈X, let z ∈ Rn with entries zn = xi − ci for all i ∈ Vn, n ∈ [N ]. We can
write expected revenue as
Φ(x,a,b) =
∑
n∈[N ] znG
n(Yn|zn,a,b)
1 +
∑
n∈[N ]G
n(Yn|zn,a,b) ,
Moreover, the assumption requiring that αti = α
t
j for all i, j ∈ Vn, n ∈ [N ] help write the term
(αt)Tp(x,a,b) as
(αt)Tp(x,a,b) =
∑
n∈N d
t
nG
n(Yn|zn,a,b)
1 +
∑
n∈[N ]G
n(Yn|zn,a,b)
Thus, we can write the objective function of the robust problem as
L(x,a,b) =H(z,a,b) =
∑
n∈[N ] znG
n(Yn|zn,a,b)
1 +
∑
n∈[N ]G
n(Yn|zn,a,b) −
T∑
t=1
λtmax{0, (dt)TpG− rt},
which is also the objective function given by a MNL model with N items. Lemma 4 tells us
that (an,b
n
) is the unique solution to the minimization problem min(an,bn)∈AnGn(Y
n|zn,a,b)
and (an,bn) is the unique solution to the maximization problem max(an,bn)∈AnGn(Y
n|zn,a,b)
(we refer the reader to Section 3.2 for the definitions of An, an, bn). Then, we can follow the
same way as in the proof of Lemmas 9, 10 and Theorem 4 to show that the robust problem
maxz∈RN min(a,b)∈AH(z,a,b) is equivalent to maxz∈RN H(z,a,b), which also means that the prob-
lem maxx∈Rm min(a,b)∈AH(z,a,b) is equivalent to maxz∈RN H(z,a,b).
Now we show that (27) can be converted equivalently into a convex optimization problem.
For any vector pG ∈ ∆N := {p ∈ RN+ |
∑
n pn < 1} such that
∑
i p
G
i < 1, we denote by z(p
G)
a vector of prices that results in probabilities pG and let Θ(z) : RN → RN such that Θ(z)n =
Gn(Yn|zn)
/(
1 +
∑
j∈[N ]G
j(Yj|zj)
)
, where Gn(Yn|zn) = Gn(Yn|zn,a,b) but we omit the choice
parameters (a,b) for notational simplicity. We also denote by b˜ a vector of size N with entries
b˜n = 〈bn〉. The lemma below show that given any pG, z(pG) can be uniquely determined by solving
a strictly convex optimization problem. The structure of the problem presented in this lemma is
slightly different with those considered in Theorem 4.1 in Zhang et al. (2018), so even though the
proof of the lemma is quite similar, we provide its own proof for the sake of self-contained.
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Lemma 11. Given pG ∈∆N , there is a unique vector z(pG) ∈RN such that Θ(z(pG)) = pG, and
this z(pG) is the unique solution to the convex optimization problem.
min
z∈RN
ln
1 + ∑
n∈[N ]
Gn(Yn|zn)
+ ∑
n∈[N ]
pGn b˜nzn
 (40)
Proof: We first prove that (40) is a strictly convex optimization problem. To this end, we will show
that ∇2Q(z) is a positive definite matrix, where Q(z) = ln
(
1 +
∑
n∈[N ]G
n(Yn|zn)
)
. To simplify
the proof and make use of the results in Zhang et al. (2018), let us denote u(z) : RN → RN such
that u(z)n =− lnGn(Yn|zn)/b˜n. with this definition we have
∂u(z)n
∂zn
=
∑
i∈Vn ∂G
n
i (Y
n|zn)Yib˜n
Gn(Yn|zn)˜bn
= 1.
The objective function now can be written as
Q(u(z)) = ln
1 + ∑
n∈[N ]
exp(−u(z)n).

Taking the derivative of Q with respect to zn we obtain
∂Q(u(z))
∂zn
=
∂Q(u)
∂un
∣∣∣∣
u=u(z)
∂u(z)n
∂zn
=
∂Q(u)
∂un
∣∣∣∣
u=u(z)
.
And if we take the second derivative with respective to zn, zk, n,k ∈ [N ] we get
∂2Q(u(z))
∂zn∂zk
=
∂2Q(u)
∂un∂uk
∣∣∣∣
u=u(z)
,
or equivalently ∇2Q(z) = ∇2uQ(u), where u = u(z). Moreover, Q(u) is just a special objective
function under the MNL model with N products and all the PSP are equal to 1. As a result,
∇2uQ(u) is positive definite (see Theorem 4.1 Zhang et al. 2018), so ∇2Q(z) is also positive definite,
as desired.
Now we know that (40) is strictly convex, so it yields a unique solution. Moreover, one can show
that (40) have finite optimal solutions. For any n∈ [N ], taking the derivative of Q(z) with respect
to zn and set it to zero we obtain∑
n∈[N ]
∑
i∈Vn−∂Gni (Yn|zn)Yib˜n
1 +G(Y)
= pGn b˜n,
or equivalently, pGn = Θ(z). So,if z(p
G) is the unique solution to (40), we always have pG = Θ(zP )
as desired. 
Next, we will show that the first part of H(z,a,b) is a concave function of pG. We also omit
the choice parameters for notational convenience and denote W(z) =∑n∈[N ] znpGn . We have the
following lemma.
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Lemma 12. Function W(z(pG)) is concave in pG, for all pG ∈∆N .
Proof: Similar to the previous proof, we also denote u(z)n = − lnGn(Yn|zn). We also see that
pG is also a choice probability vector given by a MNL model with N products with the utility
vector −u(z(pG)) ◦ b˜. So, if we denote u′(pG) be a mapping from RN to RN such that pGn =
exp(−b˜nu′(pG)n)
/(∑
n∈[N ] exp(−b˜nu′(pG)n)
)
, then we have u(z(pG)) = u′(pG)
∂W(z(pG))
∂pGn
= z(pG)n +
∑
j∈[n]
pGj ∂z(p
G)j
∂pGn
= z(pG)n +
∑
j∈[N ]
pGj
∂z(pG)j
∂u(z(pG))j
∂u(z(pG))j
∂pGn
= z(pG)n +
∑
j∈[N ]
pGj
∂u′(pG)j
∂pGn
and
∂2W(z(pG))
∂pGn ∂p
G
k
=
∂z(pG)n
∂pGk
+
∑
j∈[N ]
pGj
∂2u′(pG)j
∂pGn ∂p
G
k
=
∂z(pG)n
∂u(z(pG))n
∂u(z(pG))n
∂pGk
+
∑
j∈[N ]
pGj
∂2u′(pG)j
∂pGn ∂p
G
k
=
∂u′(pG)n
∂pGk
+
∑
j∈[N ]
pGj
∂2u′(pG)j
∂pGn ∂p
G
k
Moreover, if we denote W ′(pG) =∑n∈[N ] u′(pG)npGn , we also have
∂2W ′(pG)
∂pGn ∂p
G
k
=
∂u′(pG)n
∂pGk
+
∑
j∈[N ]
pGj
∂2u′(pG)j
∂pGn ∂p
G
k
, ∀n,k ∈ [N ].
So, ∇2W(z(pG)) = ∇2W ′(pG). We also see that W ′(pG) is the expected revenue function (as a
function of the purchase probabilities pG) where there are N products, the choice model is MNL,
the PSP are b˜ and the utility vector is −u′(pG) ◦ b˜ (◦ is the dot product). So we know that
∇2W ′(pG) is positive definite (Zhang et al. 2018), so W ′(z(pG)) is strictly concave in pG. 
With all of the above results, we can formulate (27) as
max
pG,y
W(z(pG))−
T∑
t=1
λtyt
subject to (dt)TpG− yt ≤ rt∑
n∈[N ]
pGn ≤ 1
pG,y≥ 0.
which is a convex optimization problem, as W(z(pG)) is strictly concave.
Appendix E: Detailed numerical results
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Average Max Worst
Percentile rank
of RO worst-case
DET SA10 SA50 RO DET SA10 SA50 RO DET SA10 SA50 RO DET SA10 SA50
0.5 22.6 22.6 22.4 22.4 23.5 23.4 22.9 22.9 21.3 21.5 21.7 21.7 8 4 2
1.0 22.4 22.1 22.1 21.7 24.0 22.8 22.8 22.3 19.1 20.6 20.6 20.7 13 2 2
1.5 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.0 24.3 23.7 22.9 21.4 16.2 17.7 19.0 19.8 19 12 5
2.0 21.7 21.7 21.6 20.2 24.4 23.4 22.9 20.6 12.5 15.7 16.8 18.9 20 12 8
2.5 20.8 20.9 21.0 19.4 24.5 24.0 23.5 19.7 8.8 10.4 12.3 18.1 27 22 17
3.0 19.9 20.5 20.7 18.7 24.5 22.8 22.9 18.9 5.7 10.9 10.6 17.3 32 17 15
3.5 19.2 20.2 20.0 17.9 24.6 22.6 22.8 18.1 3.6 8.5 7.9 16.6 33 15 17
4.0 18.1 19.5 19.3 17.3 24.6 22.9 23.4 17.4 2.0 4.8 3.7 16.0 37 20 26
4.5 17.5 18.4 18.6 16.6 24.6 23.5 22.9 16.7 1.1 2.3 3.3 15.3 38 31 27
5.0 17.5 17.5 18.2 15.9 24.6 23.7 23.1 16.1 0.6 1.1 1.6 14.6 35 34 28
5.5 16.5 17.5 17.0 15.3 24.6 23.4 23.2 15.4 0.4 0.7 0.9 14.1 39 31 35
6.0 16.0 17.0 16.7 14.7 24.6 23.7 23.3 14.8 0.2 0.4 0.5 13.5 40 34 35
6.5 15.7 16.5 16.0 14.2 24.6 23.0 23.3 14.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 13.1 41 33 37
7.0 15.3 15.5 15.8 13.7 24.6 23.2 23.3 13.7 0.1 0.2 0.1 12.4 41 37 37
7.5 14.8 15.1 15.7 13.1 24.6 23.5 23.1 13.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 12.0 43 40 36
8.0 15.4 14.9 15.2 12.7 24.6 23.5 22.9 12.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 11.5 39 39 37
8.5 14.6 14.4 15.0 12.2 24.6 23.4 23.3 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 42 41 38
9.0 13.5 15.1 14.5 11.7 24.6 23.7 22.7 11.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.6 46 38 39
9.5 14.5 14.0 14.5 11.3 24.6 23.9 22.8 11.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.2 42 43 38
10.0 13.8 14.1 13.5 10.9 24.6 23.8 23.4 11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.8 45 41 43
Average 34 27.3 26.1
Table 1 Comparison results for unconstrained robust (RO), deterministic (DET), and sampling-based (SA10
and SA50) pricing under the MNL logit model with homogeneous PSP.
Average Max Worst
Percentile rank
of RO worst-case
DET SA10 SA50 RO DET SA10 SA50 RO DET SA10 SA50 RO DET SA10 SA50
0.5 23.5 23.3 23.3 23.3 24.5 23.8 23.8 23.8 22.2 22.6 22.6 22.6 18 4 4
1.0 23.2 23.0 22.7 22.8 24.9 23.8 23.2 23.3 20.0 21.4 21.6 21.6 31 5 2
1.5 22.7 22.6 22.5 21.9 25.2 23.6 23.2 22.3 16.7 20.0 20.3 20.6 40 8 6
2.0 22.3 22.3 22.0 21.1 25.3 23.5 22.9 21.5 12.8 18.0 18.9 19.7 44 14 9
2.5 21.3 21.8 21.6 20.4 25.4 23.3 22.5 20.7 9.0 15.7 17.4 18.9 60 19 11
3.0 20.2 21.6 21.3 19.5 25.5 23.6 22.6 19.7 5.7 11.6 14.5 18.1 75 26 15
3.5 19.9 20.8 20.8 18.8 25.5 23.2 23.3 19.0 3.4 9.5 8.9 17.4 66 29 32
4.0 18.8 20.1 20.2 18.1 25.5 23.6 22.7 18.2 2.0 5.6 7.8 16.6 75 46 32
4.5 18.2 19.6 19.5 17.3 25.5 23.7 22.9 17.5 1.1 3.1 4.5 16.0 74 48 41
5.0 17.3 19.3 19.0 16.7 25.5 22.7 22.9 16.8 0.6 3.2 2.8 15.3 79 39 45
5.5 16.8 18.5 18.2 16.1 25.5 22.9 23.1 16.2 0.3 1.7 1.6 14.7 81 46 52
6.0 16.2 17.5 17.7 15.5 25.5 24.0 23.1 15.6 0.2 0.5 0.9 14.2 81 66 58
6.5 16.5 16.9 16.9 14.9 25.5 23.2 23.5 15.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 13.6 77 65 69
7.0 16.1 16.6 16.7 14.3 25.5 23.3 22.8 14.4 0.0 0.2 0.4 13.1 80 69 65
7.5 15.5 16.2 16.4 13.8 25.5 22.8 23.3 13.9 0.0 0.2 0.1 12.5 83 66 66
8.0 15.0 15.6 15.8 13.2 25.5 24.1 23.5 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 12.1 87 75 70
8.5 14.9 15.2 15.3 12.7 25.5 23.3 23.1 12.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.6 86 76 75
9.0 14.9 15.2 15.2 12.4 25.5 24.1 23.4 12.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.2 85 77 76
9.5 15.4 14.6 14.7 11.9 25.5 23.9 22.9 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.8 83 81 76
10.0 14.8 14.4 14.7 11.5 25.5 22.8 22.5 11.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.3 85 77 72
Average 69.5 46.8 43.8
Table 2 Comparison results for unconstrained robust (RO), deterministic (DET), and sampling-based (SA10
and SA50) pricing under the nested logit model with homogeneous PSP.
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Average Max Worst
Percentile rank
of RO worst-case
DET SA10 SA50 RO DET SA10 SA50 RO DET SA10 SA50 RO DET SA10 SA50
0.2 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.2 39.8 39.7 39.6 38.9 36.7 36.9 37.0 37.2 9 6 4
0.4 38.3 38.2 38.2 37.3 40.5 39.6 39.7 38.0 33.6 35.1 35.0 35.6 10 3 4
0.6 38.1 38.1 38.0 36.1 40.9 40.0 39.5 36.7 29.7 32.7 33.3 34.3 18 6 5
0.8 37.5 37.7 37.3 34.8 41.2 40.4 38.8 35.3 25.9 27.2 31.3 33.2 27 15 5
1.0 37.2 37.2 36.9 33.6 41.3 38.9 38.5 33.9 18.4 26.3 28.7 31.9 30 8 8
1.2 36.7 36.7 36.6 32.3 41.5 39.2 38.5 32.5 14.1 23.9 24.0 30.8 30 13 8
1.4 36.0 36.1 35.6 31.0 41.5 38.2 37.1 31.2 10.9 22.5 21.9 29.6 34 11 8
1.6 35.2 35.3 35.3 29.8 41.5 36.7 36.6 29.9 8.2 21.6 22.4 28.6 40 7 5
1.8 35.4 35.2 34.7 28.6 41.5 37.0 36.0 28.7 7.4 16.7 16.9 27.3 37 8 5
2.0 34.9 34.7 34.4 27.4 41.6 36.5 35.8 27.5 3.8 14.0 14.7 26.5 38 8 8
2.2 34.4 34.7 33.8 26.3 41.6 38.4 35.0 26.4 2.7 7.6 17.4 25.5 38 23 5
2.4 34.4 34.5 33.8 25.2 41.6 36.7 35.2 25.3 1.1 7.8 14.4 24.6 35 11 8
2.6 33.7 33.4 33.7 24.1 41.6 34.7 35.2 24.2 1.0 10.2 9.5 23.5 40 6 7
2.8 33.8 33.5 33.5 23.1 41.6 35.6 35.5 23.2 0.7 6.5 7.4 22.6 36 10 9
3.0 33.4 31.7 33.3 22.1 41.6 32.5 35.3 22.2 0.6 15.2 5.8 21.6 37 4 10
3.2 33.7 34.0 33.0 21.2 41.6 36.7 34.5 21.3 0.3 3.0 7.3 20.4 35 12 6
3.4 34.1 33.1 30.8 20.2 41.6 35.0 31.6 20.3 0.3 4.5 16.0 19.5 32 8 3
3.6 33.7 32.0 31.7 19.3 41.6 33.2 32.8 19.5 0.2 1.5 10.4 18.6 33 6 5
3.8 33.0 32.6 32.0 18.4 41.6 42.6 33.4 18.6 0.1 0.1 5.3 17.8 36 40 5
4.0 34.2 31.8 31.4 17.6 41.6 32.8 32.4 17.8 0.0 7.1 6.3 17.0 29 4 4
4.2 33.6 32.8 30.8 16.8 41.6 35.1 31.8 16.9 0.1 0.9 4.8 16.1 30 9 4
4.4 34.0 29.2 30.6 16.0 41.6 29.7 31.6 16.2 0.0 5.8 4.2 15.4 29 3 4
4.6 34.4 33.6 30.7 15.3 41.6 36.9 31.7 15.4 0.1 0.1 1.9 14.6 26 12 4
4.8 34.0 33.8 31.0 14.5 41.6 41.6 32.1 14.7 0.0 0.0 4.6 13.9 28 31 4
5.0 33.9 32.3 29.6 13.8 41.6 34.3 30.3 14.0 0.0 1.5 4.0 13.2 27 8 3
Acerage 30.6 10.9 5.6
Table 3 Comparison results for unconstrained robust (RO), deterministic (DET), and sampling-based (SA10
and SA50) pricing under a nested logit model with partition-wise homogeneous PSP.
Mai T. and Jaillet P.: Robust Multi-product Pricing under General Extreme Value Models
Article submitted; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!) 55
Average Max Worst
Percentile rank
of RO worst-case
λ 
DET-
CON
DET-
PEN
SA10 RO
DET-
CON
DET-
PEN
SA10 RO
DET-
CON
DET-
PEN
SA10 RO
DET-
CON
DET-
PEN
SA10
0.2
0.5 19.9 20.9 20.7 20.1 21.4 21.9 21.3 20.4 17.4 18.7 19.2 19.3 47 3 2
1.0 19.9 20.9 20.2 18.7 22.8 22.4 20.8 18.9 13.6 16.0 17.9 17.9 21 6 2
1.5 19.9 20.9 21.0 17.1 23.6 22.5 22.5 17.2 8.5 12.7 12.3 16.3 17 6 6
2.0 19.9 20.9 20.5 15.6 24.4 22.6 21.5 15.7 5.2 8.0 10.9 15.0 16 8 4
2.5 20.0 20.8 20.3 14.2 24.9 22.6 21.3 14.2 2.9 5.8 5.0 13.5 14 8 4
3.0 20.0 20.7 19.7 12.8 25.8 22.6 20.5 12.9 1.5 3.2 6.4 12.1 12 8 3
0.4
0.5 19.8 20.0 19.9 19.2 21.0 21.0 21.0 19.5 17.4 17.8 17.9 18.4 10 3 4
1.0 19.8 20.0 19.6 17.7 21.6 21.5 20.4 17.9 14.1 13.8 16.4 16.7 8 4 2
1.5 19.7 20.0 19.1 16.2 22.2 21.6 20.1 16.3 8.6 10.5 13.7 15.3 10 6 3
2.0 19.6 19.9 19.9 14.6 22.6 21.6 21.6 14.8 6.3 6.8 8.2 13.5 10 6 6
2.5 19.5 19.8 18.1 13.3 22.9 21.7 18.8 13.4 2.3 4.9 9.0 11.9 9 7 3
3.0 19.6 19.8 19.7 11.9 23.1 21.7 21.7 12.0 1.5 2.2 1.2 10.3 9 7 7
0.6
0.5 19.7 19.7 19.6 19.0 20.9 20.9 20.5 19.4 17.4 17.3 17.5 18.1 6 5 3
1.0 19.6 19.6 19.6 17.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 17.8 14.0 13.8 14.7 16.1 5 5 4
1.5 19.5 19.5 19.5 15.9 21.4 21.4 21.4 16.2 9.6 10.2 9.1 14.6 7 7 7
2.0 19.4 19.3 18.6 14.2 21.5 21.5 19.9 14.7 6.9 4.5 9.3 12.9 8 9 4
2.5 19.3 19.3 18.6 12.7 21.5 21.5 20.2 13.3 4.2 2.9 5.6 11.4 8 8 5
3.0 19.1 19.0 18.8 10.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 11.9 1.5 2.3 2.2 3.2 2 2 5
0.8
0.5 19.6 19.6 19.6 18.8 20.8 20.8 20.8 19.4 17.3 17.4 17.2 17.8 3 3 3
1.0 19.5 19.5 19.5 17.2 21.3 21.3 21.3 17.8 13.7 13.6 12.7 15.6 4 3 3
1.5 19.3 19.3 19.3 15.5 21.5 21.4 21.5 16.2 9.6 9.1 8.9 13.6 5 4 4
2.0 19.0 19.1 17.1 13.7 21.5 21.5 18.1 14.7 6.0 6.0 13.2 13.3 5 4 5
2.5 18.8 18.9 18.9 11.4 21.5 21.5 21.5 13.2 3.4 3.5 2.4 4.1 2 2 6
3.0 18.7 18.7 18.7 10.6 21.5 21.5 21.5 12.0 1.9 2.5 2.0 7.4 5 5 5
Average 10.1 5.4 4.2
Table 4 Comparison results for deterministic constrained pricing (DET-CON), deterministic pricing with
over-expected-sale penalties (DET-PEN), sampling-based pricing with over-expected-sale penalties (SA10), and
robust pricing with over-expected-sale penalties (RO).
